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8079本文从最优契约理论、管理层权力理论和心理所有权理论等视角对高管显性激励安排与代理成本关系的研究成果进行了述评,发现该领域研究正在逐步由关注单一激励安排的局部均衡分析阶段,向更加注重协同效应的一般均衡分析阶段过渡。针对现有研究存在的不足,本文提出了未来研究的展望,包括正确区分股权和期权激励对代理成本的不同影响、系统考虑显性激励与隐性激励的协同效应、深化心理因素对高管激励安排的治理效果等。
高管显性激励与代理成本关系研究述评与未来展望
摘要
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引用本文
徐向艺, 陆淑婧, 方政. 高管显性激励与代理成本关系研究述评与未来展望[J]. 外国经济与管理, 2016, 38(1): 101–112.
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