6133 
64002008年的新《劳动合同法》是否真的保护了企业的基层员工与增加企业的价值，至今学术界仍在进行激烈的讨论。文章利用大样本的实证研究方法，分析了劳动保护对企业的业绩薪酬敏感性的影响，并识别该影响在员工和高管间是否有所差异，以获得劳动保护经济后果的新证据。研究发现，劳动保护降低了企业整体的业绩薪酬敏感性，降低了高管却提高了员工的业绩薪酬敏感性；考虑行业因素后发现劳动保护增加了高劳动密集型企业的业绩薪酬敏感性，而且在增加高劳动密集型企业员工业绩薪酬敏感性的同时降低了高管的业绩薪酬敏感性；进一步研究发现公司治理可以抑制劳动保护对企业业绩薪酬敏感性的不利影响。文章丰富了《劳动合同法》经济后果研究的文献，说明劳动保护法律实施需要同时考虑高管和员工的利益，实现企业内部的利益相关者之间的“互利共赢”的局面。
劳动保护：保护员工还是优待高管？——基于业绩薪酬敏感性视角
摘要
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引用本文
罗劲博. 劳动保护：保护员工还是优待高管？——基于业绩薪酬敏感性视角[J]. 上海财经大学学报, 2018, 20(3): 44-62.
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