4427 
6445依赖“土地财政”的地方政府在面对不利的房地产市场冲击时会采取什么措施平滑财政收入波动呢？文章识别并分析了一个潜在的重要机制，即中国地方政府“借道”融资平台获得土地出让金，进而反哺预算内财政收入的机制。利用土地出让和融资平台的微观数据，文章发现：中国城市的政府融资平台购买住宅和商服用地占比具有显著的“逆周期性”，即在房地产市场调整期成交额（面积）比例显著上升。进一步的分析表明，对于那些“财政压力”较大、地方官员晋升动机较高的城市，这一“逆周期性”表现得更加明显。融资平台购地的资金主要来源于融资平台债务的增加，而非地方政府后期的补贴，这可能会进一步增加地方政府的隐性债务。且上述“逆周期性”主要存在于中西部地区和三、四线城市。文章的发现对深入了解地方政府“土地财政”的运作机制，理解地方政府预算内“财政压力”与预算外“隐性债务”之间的互动关系具有重要意义。
房地产周期、地方政府财政压力与融资平台购地
摘要
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张路, 龚刚. 房地产周期、地方政府财政压力与融资平台购地[J]. 财经研究, 2020, 46(6): 4-18.
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