基于代理理论与管家理论视角的家族企业经理人行为选择
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外国经济与管理 2007 年 第 29 卷第 02 期, 页码：51 - 56
摘要
参考文献
摘要
代理理论和管家理论可以说是两种基本假设截然对立的理论,但却都认为家族企业经理人有采取代理人或管家单一行为的倾向。本文在简要阐述了这两种理论的基本假设和不同观点以后,基于利他主义的桥接,得出了家族企业经理人有采取代理人和管家复合行为的倾向。
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[3]Doucouliagos,C.A note on the evolution of homo economicus[J].Journal of Economics Issues,1994,3:877-883.
[4]Albanese,R,Dacin,M T,and Harris,I C.Agents as stewards[J].Academy of Management Review,1997,22:609-611.
[5]Hart,O.Munich lectures 1,2,3[R].Munich University,Nov.2001.
[6]Tosi,A L,Brownlee,A L,Silva,P,and Katz,J P.An empiriacal exploration of decision-making under agency controls and stew-ardship structure[J].Journal of Managenment Studies,2003,40:2053-2071.
[7]Miller,D,and Breton-Miller,I L.Family governance and firm performance:Agency,stewardship,and capabilities[J].Family Busi-ness Review,2006,19:73-87.
[8]Bruce,A,Buck,T,and Main,B.Top executive remuneration:A view from Europe[J].Journal of Management Studies,2005,42:1493-1506.
[9]Gomez-Mejia,L,Wiseman,R W,and Dykes,B J.Agency problems in diverse contexts:A global perspective[J].Journal of Mana-genment Studies,2005,42:1507-1517.
[10]Davis,J H,Schoorman,F D,and Donaldson,L.The distinctiveness of agency theory and stewardship theory[J].Academy ofManagement Review,1997b,22:611-613.
[11]Preston,L E.Agents,stewards,and stakeholders[J].Academy of Management Review,1998,23:9-13.
[12]Boyd,B K.CEO duality and firm performance:A contingency model[J].Strategic Management Journal,1995,16:301-312.
[13]Schulze,W S,Lubatkin,M H,and Dino,R N.Toward a theory of agency and altruism in family firms[J].Journal of BusinessVenturing,2003,18:473-490.
[14]Schulze,W S,Lubatkin,M H,Dino,R N,and Buchholtz,A K.Agency relationships in family firms:Theory and evidence[J].Organization Science,2001,12:99-116.
[5]Chrisman,J J,Chua,J H.and Sharma,P.Trends and directions in the development of a strategic management theory of the familyfirm[J].Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice,2005,(Sep.):555-575.
[16]Buchanan,J.The Samaritan’s dilemma[A].in Phelps,E(ed.).Morality and economic theory[C].NY:Russell Sage Foundation,1975:71-85.
[17]Chami,R.What’s different about family business?[R].Unpublished Working Paper,IMF,1999.
引用本文
苏启林. 基于代理理论与管家理论视角的家族企业经理人行为选择[J]. 外国经济与管理, 2007, 29(2): 51–56.
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