机构投资者与分析师行为——基于定向增发解禁背景
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财经研究 2015 年 第 41 卷第 06 期, 页码：
摘要
参考文献
摘要
文章以上市公司定向增发解禁为背景，从利益冲突的角度检验了不同增发对象在解禁后交易动机的差异对解禁前分析师盈余预测乐观程度和准确性的影响。研究发现，定向增发股票解禁时，机构投资者出于抛售获利的动机向分析师施压，导致分析师在解禁前为其所持有的股票发布了更加乐观的盈余预测，而且这些乐观预测的准确性更低；而原股东在定向增发股票解禁后倾向于继续持有，分析师在解禁前没有发布乐观有偏的预测。进一步的研究显示，机构投资者即将解禁的股份占公司总股本的比例越高，在临近解禁日时，分析师对该上市公司的预测越乐观，准确性也越低。现有文献认为机构投资者对分析师的乐观倾向具有抑制作用，而文章的经验证据表明，机构投资者在涉及自身利益时会削弱这种抑制作用。
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[3]林雨晨，谭劲松.机构投资者与公司治理：文献评述与研究框架[J].会计与经济研究，2013，（5）：70－80.
[4]原红旗，黄倩茹.承销商分析师和非承销商分析师投资评级比较研究[J].中国会计评论，2007，（8）：286－304.
[5]朱宝宪，王怡凯.证券媒体选股建议效果的实证分析[J].经济研究，2001，（4）：51－57.
[6]Agrawal A, Chen M A. Do analyst conflicts matter? Evidence from stock recommendations[J]. Journal of Law & Economics, 2008, 51(3): 503-537.
[7]Barber M B, Lehavy R，McNichols M, et al. Can investors profit from the prophets? Security analyst recommendations and stock returns[J]. Journal of Finance, 2001, 56(2): 531-563.
[8]Barber M B,Loeffler D.The “dartboard” column: Secondhand information and price pressure[J]. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 1993, 28(2): 273-284.
[9]Barclay M J, Holderness C G, Sheehan D P. Private placements and managerial entrenchment[J]. Journal of Corporate Finance, 2007, 13（4）: 461-484.
[10]Bjerring J H, Lakonishok J, Vermaelen T. Stock prices and financial analysts’ recommendations[J]. Journal of Finance, 1983, 38(1): 187-204.
[11]Bradshaw M, Richardson S, Sloan R. Do analysts and auditors use information in accruals?[J]. Journal of Accounting Research, 2001, 39（1）: 45-74.
[12]Campbell C J, Wasley C E. Measuring abnormal daily trading volume for samples of NYSE/ASE and NASDAQ securities using parametric and nonparametric test statistics[J]. Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, 1996, 6: 309-326.
[13]Cowen A, Groysberg B, Healy P. Which types of analyst firms are more optimistic?[J]. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 2006, 41（1-2）: 119-146.
[14]Dugar A, Nathan S. The effect of investment banking relationships on financial analysts’ earnings forecasts and investment recommendations[J]. Contemporary Accounting Research, 1995, 12（1）: 131-160.
[15]Easterwood J C, Nutt S R. Inefficiency in analysts’ earnings forecasts: Systematic misreaction or systematic optimism?[J]. Journal of Finance, 1999, 54(2): 1777-1797.
[16]Francis J, Philbrick D, Schipper K. Shareholder litigation and corporate disclosures[J]. Journal of Accounting Research, 1994, 32(2): 137-164.
[17]Francis J, Philbrick D. Analysts’ decisions as products of a multitask environment[J]. Journal of Accounting Research, 1993, 31（2）: 216-230.
[18]Gu Z Y, Li Z Q, Yang Y G, et al. Friends in need is friends indeed[R]. Working Paper, 2014.
[19]Gu Z Y, Li Z Q, Yang Y G. Monitors or predators: The influence of institutional investors on sellside analysts[J]. Accounting Review, 2013, 88(1): 137-169.
[20]Hong H, Kubik J D. Analyzing the analysts: Career concerns and biased earnings forecasts[J]. Journal of Finance, 2003, 58（1）: 313-351.
[21]Irvine P. Analysts’ forecasts and brokeragefirm trading[J]. Accounting Review, 2004, 79（1）: 125-149.
[22]Jackson A R. Trade generation, reputation, and sellside analysts[J]. Journal of Finance, 2005, 60（2）: 673-717.
[23]Jacob J, Lys T Z, Neale M A. Expertise in forecasting performance of security analysts[J]. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 1999, 28（1）: 51-82.
[24]Lang M, Lundholm R. Corporate disclosure policy and analyst behavior[J]. Accounting Review, 1996, 71（4）: 467-492.
[25]Lin H, McNichols M F. Underwriting relationships, analysts’ earnings forecasts and investment recommendations[J]. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 1998, 25（1）: 101-127.
[26]Ljungqvist A, Marston F, Starks L T, et al. Conflicts of interest in sellside research and the moderating role of institutional investors[J]. Journal of Financial Economics, 2007, 85(2): 420-456.
[27]Michaely R, Womack K L. Conflict of interest and the credibility of underwriter analyst recommendations [J]. Review of Financial Studies, 1999, 12（4）: 653-686.
[28]Mola S, Guidolin M. Affiliated mutual funds and analyst optimism[J]. Journal of Financial Economics, 2009, 93(1): 108-137.
[29]O’Brien P C, Mcnichols M F, HsiouWei L. Analyst impartiality and investment banking relationships[J]. Journal of Accounting Research, 2005, 43(4): 623-650.
[30]Schipper K. Capital markets research in accounting[J]. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 2001, 31（1-3）: 105-231.
引用本文
官 峰, 靳庆鲁, 张佩佩. 机构投资者与分析师行为——基于定向增发解禁背景[J]. 财经研究, 2015, 41(6): 0.
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