公司异质性、在职消费与机构投资者治理
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财经研究 2012 年 第 38 卷第 06 期, 页码：28 - 38
摘要
参考文献
摘要
文章实证检验了在代理成本不同的上市公司中,机构投资者持股与管理层在职消费之间的关系。研究发现,机构投资者持股能够有效降低管理层在职消费,而且这种抑制作用在代理成本较高的公司中更加明显;同时,管理层在职消费与公司绩效负相关,这一负相关关系同样在代理成本较高的公司中更加显著。研究结果表明,大力发展机构投资者有利于公司治理的改善,而且在代理成本不同的上市公司中机构投资者的治理作用存在显著差异。
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[2]陈冬华,陈信元,万华林.国有企业中的薪酬管制与在职消费[J].经济研究,2005,(2):92-101.
[3]陈冬华,梁上坤.在职消费、股权制衡及其经济后果———来自中国上市公司的经验证据[J].上海立信会计学院学报,2010,(1):19-27.
[4]卢锐,魏明海,黎文靖.管理层权力、在职消费与产权效率———来自中国上市公司的证据[J].南开管理评论,2008,(5):85-92.
[5]罗宏,黄文华.国企分红、在职消费与公司业绩[J].管理世界,2008,(9):139-148.
[6]王琨,肖星.机构投资者持股与关联方占用的实证研究[J].南开管理评论,2005,(2):27-33.
[7]周玮.政治密度、在职消费与制度环境[J].软科学,2010,(8):65-69.
[8]Berle A,Means G.The modern corporation and private property[M].New York:Macmillan,1932.
[9]Boyd J H,Smith B D.The co-evolution of the real and financial sectors in the growthprocess[J].World Bank Economic Review,1996,10(2):371-396.
[10]Easterbrook F.Two agency cost explanations of dividends[J].American Economic Review,1984,74(4):650-659.
[11]Fazzari S M,Petersen B C.Working capital and fixed investment:New evidence on fi-nancing constraints[J].RAND Journal of Economics,1993,24(3):328-342.
[12]Hartzell J C,Starks L T.Institutional investors and executive compensation[J].Jour-nal of Finance,2003,28(6):2351-2374.
[13]Hirsch F.Social limits to growth[M].Cambridge:Harvard University Press,1976.
[14]Jensen M.Agency costs of free cash flow,corporate finance,and takeovers[J].American Economic Review,1986,76(2):323-329.
[15]Jensen M,Meckling W.Theory of the firm:Managerial behavior,agency costs,and capital structure[J].Journal of Financial Economics,1976,3:305-360.
[16]Jensen M,Murphy K.Performance pay and top-management incentives[J].Journal of Political Economy,1990,98(2):225-264.
[17]Rajan R G,Wulf J.Are perks purely managerial excess?[J].Journal of Financial Economics,2006,79(1):1-33.
[18]Yermack D.Flights of fancy:Corporate jets,CEO perquisites,and inferior sharehold-er returns[J].Journal of Financial Economics,2006,80(1):211-242.
引用本文
李艳丽, 孙剑非, 伊志宏. 公司异质性、在职消费与机构投资者治理[J]. 财经研究, 2012, 38(6): 28–38.
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