3278 
3360文章基于我国转型经济特殊环境和关系型社会制度背景，以2010-2017年主并方为A股上市公司为样本，实证研究了并购双方CEO校友关系对并购决策与并购效果的影响。研究发现，主并方与被并方CEO校友关系会导致错误的并购决策和较低的股东回报，显著降低了并购宣告日[-2，+2]时间窗主并公司股票累计异常收益率，提高了被并方CEO留任的可能性和主并方CEO薪酬；双方CEO存在校友关系的企业更容易发生并购，但这类并购发生资产剥离的概率更高，甚至剥离也很难改善绩效。研究结果有利于企业理性运用社会关系资源，降低并购中的代理问题，为规范并购决策的科学性与审慎性、提高并购绩效提供了理论支持与经验证据。
CEO校友关系会影响并购决策与并购效果吗
摘要
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引用本文
张洽, 袁天荣. CEO校友关系会影响并购决策与并购效果吗[J]. 上海财经大学学报, 2020, 22(3): 82-96.
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