3172 
2973国有企业薪酬管制是我国收入分配制度的重要内容之一，但其实施效果却一直充满争议。区别于以往探究政策效果的研究，文章从风险补偿角度，以2012－2016年A股上市公司为研究样本，使用双重差分模型，考察了董责险对薪酬管制的优化调节作用。研究发现，限薪令会增加国有企业董责险的购买，且这一结果在成长性较高的国有企业中更为显著。此外，限薪令下，董责险能够从风险控制的角度对国有企业高管人员进行补偿，并且这种风险补偿弥补了“限薪令”带来的效率损失，提升了国有企业绩效，这一正面效应在风险较高的国有企业中更为明显。进一步研究发现，董责险主要通过补偿高管人员的风险损失以及提高边际生产率来发挥作用，论证了董责险对于高管人员的薪酬调节和激励功能。文章的研究结论为管制及国有企业制度创新提供了参考，对当前我国收入分配制度的完善具有启示意义。
董事高管责任险、薪酬替代与企业绩效——基于国有企业“限薪令”的准自然实验
摘要
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引用本文
张人方. 董事高管责任险、薪酬替代与企业绩效——基于国有企业“限薪令”的准自然实验[J]. 上海财经大学学报, 2021, 23(3): 107-121.
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