“国富”的程度,也即国民收入分配格局中政府税收的份额,从根本上来说是由居民收入的分配方式所决定的。其支撑在于:首先,收入分配的不平等程度、累进制下不同税级之间税率的比值以及纳税档次门槛的设定是决定政府税收规模的重要因素;其次,累进税制的实施和利益共享式的再分配,使得国民收入中政府税收占比在收入差距扩大和收入分配改善的情形下均能得到有效提升,“国富”形成的本质原因即在于此;最后,收入分配影响政府税收的效应具有空间差异,中部省份政府税收占比的上升与收入差距的扩大有关,而东部和西部省份的税收增加则来自于收入分配的改善。因此,深化收入分配制度改革,既要提高高档次税级税率和纳税门槛,又要继续实施利益共享式的再分配,以使税收在实现持续增长的同时,居民收入差距不断缩小。
收入分配与政府税收:“国富”的一种解释
摘要
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引用本文
李子联, 王爱民, 李笑. 收入分配与政府税收:“国富”的一种解释[J]. 上海财经大学学报, 2017, 19(2): 13–26.
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