3438 
2169钱德勒认为，随着“支薪经理”的不断涉入，“经理式企业”取代“家庭式企业”是家族企业发展的必然趋势。然而，关于家族企业创新的研究则发现，家族企业的创新产出优势来自家族涉入的影响。因此，钱德勒关于“管理革命”的论述与家族企业创新研究的发现存在逻辑张力。为了解开这一谜题，本文探讨家族企业引入非家族高管这种职业化方式对其创新产出的影响。基于我国上市家族企业的样本数据，通过对引入非家族高管所产生的代理收益和代理成本的比较分析，本文发现，虽然家族企业引进非家族高管能够提升企业的创新产出，但是当高管团队中的非家族高管比例达到一定高度之后，继续引进非家族高管所带来的创新产出净收益呈现下降趋势。非家族高管的现金激励和股权激励则会延缓家族企业创新产出净收益的下降趋势。家族成员担任“一把手”时也存在类似的效应。上述发现揭示了职业化对家族企业创新行为的内在影响力量，不仅更新了人们对钱德勒命题的认识，也为家族企业提供了增进职业化净收益的策略和管理启示。
非家族高管比例与家族企业创新产出的关系研究——对钱德勒命题的反思
摘要
参考文献
1 陈凌. 超越钱德勒命题——重新评价《看得见的手》[J]. 管理世界,2005, (5): 160-165. DOI:10.19744/j.cnki.11-1235/f.2005.05.028
2 陈凌, 吴炳德. 市场化水平、教育程度和家族企业研发投资[J]. 科研管理,2014, 35(7): 44-50. DOI:10.19571/j.cnki.1000-2995.2014.07.006
3 姜英兵, 于雅萍. 谁是更直接的创新者?——核心员工股权激励与企业创新[J]. 经济管理,2017, 39(3): 109-127. DOI:10.19616/j.cnki.bmj.2017.03.008
4 雷丁 著, 张遵敬, 范煦, 吴振寰 译. 海外华人企业家的管理思想: 文化背景与风格[M]. 上海: 三联书店上海分店, 1993.
5 孟庆斌, 李昕宇, 张鹏. 员工持股计划能够促进企业创新吗?——基于企业员工视角的经验证据[J]. 管理世界,2019, 35(11): 209-228. DOI:10.3969/j.issn.1002-5502.2019.11.016
7 吴炳德, 陈凌. 社会情感财富与研发投资组合: 家族治理的影响[J]. 科学学研究,2014, 32(8): 1233-1241. DOI:10.3969/j.issn.1003-2053.2014.08.015
8 小艾尔弗雷德·D 钱德勒著, 重武译. 看得见的手: 美国企业的管理革命[M]. 商务印书馆, 1987.
9 小艾尔弗雷德·钱德勒著, 张逸人译. 规模与范围: 工业资本主义的原动[M]. 华夏出版社, 2016.
10 Berrone P, Cruz C, Gomez-Mejia L R. Socioemotional wealth in family firms: Theoretical dimensions, assessment approaches, and agenda for future research[J]. Family Business Review,2012, 25(3): 258-279. DOI:10.1177/0894486511435355
11 Block J H. R&D investments in family and founder firms: An agency perspective[J]. Journal of Business Venturing,2012, 27(2): 248-265. DOI:10.1016/j.jbusvent.2010.09.003
12 Chrisman J J, Patel P C. Variations in R&D investments of family and nonfamily firms: Behavioral agency and myopic loss aversion perspectives[J]. Academy of Management Journal,2012, 55(4): 976-997. DOI:10.5465/amj.2011.0211
13 Chrisman J J, Sharma P, Steier L, et al. The influence of family goals, governance, and resources on firm outcomes[J]. Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice,2013, 37(6): 1249-1261. DOI:10.1111/etap.12064
14 Chua J H, Chrisman J J, Sharma P. Defining the family business by behavior[J]. Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice,1999, 23(4): 19-39. DOI:10.1177/104225879902300402
15 Chua J H, Chrisman J J, Bergiel E B. An agency theoretic analysis of the professionalized family firm[J]. Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice,2009, 33(2): 355-372. DOI:10.1111/j.1540-6520.2009.00294.x
16 Claessens S, Djankov S, Fan J P, et al. Disentangling the incentive and entrenchment effects of large shareholdings[J]. The Journal of Finance,2002, 57(6): 2741-2771. DOI:10.1111/1540-6261.00511
17 Duran P, Kammerlander N, Van Essen M, et al. Doing more with less: Innovation input and output in family firms[J]. Academy of Management Journal,2016, 59(4): 1224-1264. DOI:10.5465/amj.2014.0424
18 Fama E F, Jensen M C. Separation of ownership and control[J]. The Journal of Law and Economics,1983, 26(2): 301-325. DOI:10.1086/467037
19 Gedajlovic E, Carney M. Markets, hierarchies, and families: Toward a transaction cost theory of the family firm[J]. Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice,2010, 34(6): 1145-1172. DOI:10.1111/j.1540-6520.2010.00418.x
20 Haans R F J, Pieters C, He Z L. Thinking about U: Theorizing and testing U-and inverted U-shaped relationships in strategy research[J]. Strategic Management Journal,2016, 37(7): 1177-1195. DOI:10.1002/smj.2399
21 Jaskiewicz P, Block J H, Combs J G, et al. The effects of founder and family ownership on hired CEOs’ incentives and firm performance[J]. Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice,2017, 41(1): 73-103. DOI:10.1111/etap.12169
22 Jensen M C, Meckling W H. Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure[J]. Journal of Financial Economics,1976, 3(4): 305-360. DOI:10.1016/0304-405X(76)90026-X
23 Lind J T, Mehlum H. With or without U? The appropriate test for a U-shaped relationship[J]. Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics,2010, 72(1): 109-118. DOI:10.1111/j.1468-0084.2009.00569.x
24 Luo X R, Chung C N. Filling or abusing the institutional void? Ownership and management control of public family businesses in an emerging market[J]. Organization Science,2013, 24(2): 591-613. DOI:10.1287/orsc.1120.0751
25 Röd I. Disentangling the family firm’s innovation process: A systematic review[J]. Journal of Family Business Strategy,2016, 7(3): 185-201. DOI:10.1016/j.jfbs.2016.08.004
26 Schulze W S, Lubatkin M H, Dino R N. Toward a theory of agency and altruism in family firms[J]. Journal of Business Venturing,2003, 18(4): 473-490. DOI:10.1016/S0883-9026(03)00054-5
27 Stewart A, Hitt M A. Why can’t a family business be more like a nonfamily business?: Modes of professionalization in family firms[J]. Family Business Review,2012, 25(1): 58-86. DOI:10.1177/0894486511421665
28 Wasserman N. The throne vs. the kingdom: Founder control and value creation in startups[J]. Strategic Management Journal,2017, 38(2): 255-277. DOI:10.1002/smj.2478
引用本文
吴炳德, 张玮, 陈士慧, 等. 非家族高管比例与家族企业创新产出的关系研究——对钱德勒命题的反思[J]. 外国经济与管理, 2022, 44(10): 36-53.
导出参考文献，格式为：
