6662 
6207年老的一代创业者将经营权让渡给家族成员还是职业经理人，是控股家族的重要战略决策。虽然有众多经验研究显示聘家族CEO不利于企业绩效，但现实经济中有较多公司即便是上市公司仍然雇用家族成员做CEO。为解释这种看似“无效率”的聘任安排，本文将民营企业管理职业化问题置于代际传承的背景下，将关注焦点从营利性的企业拓展到其背后的家族，从控股家族的异质性目标探索企业聘任决策的前因变量。借助多任务委托代理模型，提出控股家族非经济目标驱动下公司与CEO的匹配框架，发现更加重视非经济目标的家族倾向于提供较低激励强度的薪酬合约，对高管的经验和能力要求较低，同时更加重视CEO的家族身份。该研究试图论证企业CEO的聘任决策内生于家族异质性目标，尝试填补家族的意愿和控制能力之间逻辑关系的理论性缺口。对家族企业聘任决策前因变量的分析，既深化了家族企业情境下的组织理论研究，也为一代创业者让渡经营权提供了决策建议。
雇亲属还是聘专家:基于控股家族目标异质性的CEO聘任研究
摘要
参考文献
14 Anderson R C, Duru A, Reeb D M. Founders, heirs, and corporate opacity in the United States[J]. Journal of financial Economics, 2009, 92(2):205-222. DOI:10.1016/j.jfineco.2008.04.006
15 Andres C. Large shareholders and firm performance-An empirical examination of founding-family ownership[J]. Journal of Corporate Finance, 2008, 14(4):431-445. DOI:10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2008.05.003
16 Ansari I F, Goergen M, Mira S. The determinants of the CEO successor choice in family firms[J]. Journal of Corporate Finance, 2014, 28:6-25. DOI:10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2013.12.006
17 Bach L, Serrano-Velarde N. CEO identity and labor contracts:Evidence from CEO transitions[J]. Journal of Corporate Finance, 2015, 33:227-242. DOI:10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2015.01.009
18 Bai C E, Lu J Y, Tao Z G. The multitask theory of state enterprise reform:empirical evidence from China[J]. American Economic Review, 2006, 96(2):353-357. DOI:10.1257/000282806777212125
19 Bennedsen M, Nielsen K M, Perez-Gonzalez F, et al. Inside the family firm:The role of families in succession decisions and performance[J]. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 2007, 122(2):647-691. DOI:10.1162/qjec.122.2.647
20 Bertrand M, Schoar A. The role of family in family firms[J]. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 2006, 20(2):73-96. DOI:10.1257/jep.20.2.73
21 Block J H. How to pay nonfamily managers in large family firms:A principal-agent model[J]. Family Business Review, 2011, 24(1):9-27. DOI:10.1177/0894486510394359
22 Cabrera-Suárez M K, de La Cruz Déniz-Déniz M, Martín-Santana J D. The setting of non-financial goals in the family firm:The influence of family climate and identification[J]. Journal of Family Business Strategy, 2014, 5(3):289-299. DOI:10.1016/j.jfbs.2014.05.003
23 Chang S J, Shim J. When does transitioning from family to professional management improve firm performance?[J]. Strategic Management Journal, 2015, 36(9):1297-1316. DOI:10.1002/smj.2289
24 Chrisman J J, Chua J H, Pearson A W, et al. Family involvement, family influence, and family-centered non-economic goals in small firms[J]. Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, 2012, 36(2):267-293. DOI:10.1111/etap.2012.36.issue-2
25 Chung C N, Luo X R. Leadership succession and firm performance in an emerging economy:Successor origin, relational embeddedness, and legitimacy[J]. Strategic Management Journal, 2013, 34(3):338-357. DOI:10.1002/smj.2013.34.issue-3
26 Cruz C C, Gómez-Mejia L R, Becerra M. Perceptions of benevolence and the design of agency contracts:CEO-TMT relationships in family firms[J]. Academy of Management Journal, 2010, 53(1):69-89. DOI:10.5465/AMJ.2010.48036975
27 De Massis A, Kotlar J, Chua J H, et al. Ability and willingness as sufficiency conditions for family-oriented particularistic behavior:Implications for theory and empirical studies[J]. Journal of Small Business Management, 2014, 52(2):344-364. DOI:10.1111/jsbm.2014.52.issue-2
28 Dou J S, Zhang Z Y, Su E. Does family involvement make firms donate more? Empirical evidence from Chinese private firms[J]. Family Business Review, 2014, 27(3):259-274. DOI:10.1177/0894486514538449
29 Gabaix X, Landier A. Why has CEO pay increased so much?[J]. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 2008, 123(1):49-100. DOI:10.1162/qjec.2008.123.issue-1
30 Gomez-Mejia L R, Cruz C, Berrone P, et al. The bind that ties:Socioemotional wealth preservation in family firms[J]. The Academy of Management Annals, 2011, 5(1):653-707. DOI:10.1080/19416520.2011.593320
32 Kellermanns F W, Eddleston K A, Zellweger T M. Extending the socioemotional wealth perspective:A look at the dark side[J]. Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, 2012, 36(6):1175-1182. DOI:10.1111/j.1540-6520.2012.00544.x
33 La Porta R, Lopez-de-Silanes F, Shleifer A. Corporate ownership around the world[J]. The Journal of Finance, 1999, 54(2):471-517. DOI:10.1111/0022-1082.00115
34 Luo X R,Chung C N. Filling or abusing the institutional void? Ownership and management control of public family businesses in an emerging market[J]. Organization Science, 2013, 24(2):591-613. DOI:10.1287/orsc.1120.0751
35 Michiels A, Voordeckers W, Lybaert N, et al. CEO Compensation in private family firms:Pay-for-performance and the moderating role of ownership and management[J]. Family Business Review, 2013, 26(2):140-160. DOI:10.1177/0894486512454731
36 Miller D, Le Breton-Miller I, Minichilli A, et al. When do non-family CEOs outperform in family firms? Agency and behavioural agency perspectives[J]. Journal of Management Studies, 2014, 51(4):547-572. DOI:10.1111/joms.2014.51.issue-4
37 Miller D, Minichilli A, Corbetta G. Is family leadership always beneficial?[J]. Strategic Management Journal, 2013, 34(5):553-571. DOI:10.1002/smj.2013.34.issue-5
38 Pérez-González F. Inherited control and firm performance[J]. American Economic Review, 2006, 96(5):1559-1588. DOI:10.1257/aer.96.5.1559
39 Stewart A, Hitt M A. Why can't a family business be more like a nonfamily business? Modes of professionalization in family firms[J]. Family Business Review, 2012, 25(1):58-86. DOI:10.1177/0894486511421665
40 Terviö M. The difference that CEOs make:An assignment model approach[J]. American Economic Review, 2008, 98(3):642-668. DOI:10.1257/aer.98.3.642
41 Zellweger T M, Nason R S, Nordqvist M, et al. Why do family firms strive for nonfinancial goals? An organizational identity perspective[J]. Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, 2013, 37(2):229-248. DOI:10.1111/etap.2013.37.issue-2
引用本文
朱建安, 陈凌, 吴炳德. 雇亲属还是聘专家:基于控股家族目标异质性的CEO聘任研究[J]. 外国经济与管理, 2016, 38(12): 3–18.
导出参考文献，格式为：
下一篇：学者董事研究现状和未来展望
本期封面
相关论文
