国外连锁董事网络研究述评与未来展望
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外国经济与管理 2014 年 第 36 卷第 05 期, 页码：69 - 80
摘要
参考文献
摘要
在网络关系竞争时代,连锁董事是公司治理领域的一个重要现象和新的研究方向,日益受到学术界和企业界的广泛关注。本文对国外研究脉络和主要观点进行了梳理和分析,主要涉及连锁董事及其网络的概念、连锁董事网络的成因及相关理论、连锁董事网络结构的测度方法、连锁董事网络治理对企业行为和价值的影响效应等方面,讨论了该领域的最新进展、动态和趋势,并在此基础上提出了未来关于连锁董事网络研究的主要方向和核心内容。
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[50]Yermack D.Remuneration,retention,and reputation incentives for outside directors[J].Journal of Finance,2004,59(5):2281-2308.
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[2]Biddle G C,et al.How does financial reporting quality relate to investment efficiency[J].Journal of Accounting and Economics,2009,48(2-3):112-125.
[3]Billett M T,et al.The influence of governance on investment:Evidence from a hazard model[J].Journal of Financial Economics,2011,102(3):643-670.
[4]Burris V.Interlocking directorates and political cohesion among corporate elites[J].American Journal of Sociology,2005,111(1):249-283.
[5]Burt R S.Structure holes:The social structure of competition[M].Orlando:Academic Press,1992.
[6]Burt R S.Corporate profits and cooptation networks of market constraints and directorate ties in the American economy[M].New York:Acadcmic Press,1983.
[7]Byrd D T and Mizruchi M S.Bankers on the board and the debt ratio of firms[J].Journal of Corporate Finance,2005,11(5):129-173.
[8]Campello M,et al.,Liquidity management and corporate investment during a financial crisis[J].Review of Financial Studies,2011,24(6):1944-1979.
[9]Chen H and Chen S.Investment-cash flow sensitivity cannot be a good measure of financial constraints:Evidence from the time series[J].Journal of Financial Economics,2012,103(6):393-410.
[10]Davis G F.Agents without principlesThe spread of the poison pill through the intercorporate network[J].Administrative Science Quarterly,1991,36(2):583-613.
[11]Davis G F,et al.The small world of the American corporate elite:1982-2001[J].Strategic Organization,2003,1(3):301-326.
[12]Davis G F and Greve H R.Corporate elite networks and governance changes in the 1980s[J].The American Journal Sociology,1997,103(1):1-37.
[13]Deutsch,et al.A dual agency view of board compensation:The joint effects of outside director and CEO stock options on firm risk[J].Strategic Management Journal,2011,32(6):212-227.
[14]Dyer J H and Singh H.The Relational view:Co-operative strategies and sources of interorganizational competitive advantage[J].Academy of Management Review,1998,23(4):660-679.
[15]Fama,et al.Separation of ownership and control[J].Journal of Law and Economics,1983,26(8):301-325.
[16]Ferris S P,et al.Too busy to mind the businessMonitoring by directors with multiple board appointments[J].Journal of Finance,2003,58(9):1087-1112.
[17]Fich E M and Shivdasani A.Are busy boards effective monitors[J].Journal of Finance,2006,61(2):689-724.
[18]Fligstein N and Brantley P.Bank control,owner control,or organizational dynamics:Who controls the large modern corporation[J].American Journal of Sociology,1992,98(2):280-307.
[19]Geletkanycz M A and Hambrick D C.The external ties of senior managers:Implications for strategic choice and performance[J].Administrative Science Quarterly,1997,42(4):654-681.
[20]Granovetter M.Economic action and social structure:The problem of embeddedness[J].American Journal of Sociology,1985,91(5):481-510.
[21]Gulati R.Network location and learning:The influence of network resources and firm capabilities on alliance formation[J].Strategic Management Journal,1999,20(5):397-420.
[22]Gulati R.Alliances and networks[J].Strategic Management Journal,1998,19:293-317.
[23]Hackbarth D and Mauer D C.Optimal priority structure,capital structure,and investment[J].Review of Financial Studies,2012,25(3):747-796.
[24]Haunschild P R.When do interlocks matterAlternative sources of information and interlock influence[J].Administrative Science Quarterly,1998,43(6):815-844.
[25]Hillman,et al.The resource dependence role of corporate directors:strategic adaptation of board composition in response to environmental change[J].Journal of Management Studies,2000,37(2):213-255.
[26]Hochberg,et al.Whom you know matters:Venture capital networks and investment performance[J].The Journal of Finance,2007,62:251-301.
[27]Kilduff M and Tsai W.Social networks and organizations[M].London:Sage Publications Ltd,2003.
[28]Kroszner R S and Strahan P E.Bankers on boards:Monitoring,conflicts of interest,and lender liability[J].Journal of Financial Economics,2001,62(1):415-452.
[29]Larcker,et al.Boardroom centrality and stock returns[R].Stanford University,2010.
[30]Lerner,et al.Private equity and long-run investment:The case of innovation[J].The Journal of Finance,2011,66(2):445-477.
[31]Lin N.Social capital:A theory of social structure and action[R].Cambridge University Press,2002.
[32]Lin N.Building a network theory of social capital[J].Connections,1999,22(1):28-51.
[33]Maman D.Research Note:Interlocking ties within business groups in Israel[J].Organization Studies,1999,20(2):323-339.
[34]Masulis R W and Mobbs S.Are all inside directors the sameEvidence from the external directorship market[J].Journal of Finance,2011,66(3):823-872.
[35]McLean R D,et al.Why does the law matterInvestor protection and its effects on investment,finance,and growth[J].Journal of Finance,2012,67(4):313-350.
[36]Mizruchi M S.What do interlocks doAn analysis,critique,and assessment of research on interlocking directorates[J].Annual Review of Sociology,1996,22(3):271-298.
[37]Mizruchi M S and Stearns L B.A longitudinal study of the formation of interlocking directorates[J].Administrative Science Quarterly,1988,39(9):194-210.
[38]Nahapiet J and Ghoshal S.Social capital,intellectual capital and the organizational advantage[J].The Academy of Management Review,1998,23(2):242-266.
[39]Officer M S.Overinvestment,corporate governance,and dividend initiations[J].Journal of Corporate Finance,2011,17(3):710-724.
[40]Ritter T A.Framework for analyzing interconnectedness of relationships[J].Industrial Marketing Management,2000,29(4):317-326.
[41]Rosenstein W.Inside directors,board independence and shareholder wealth[J].Journal of Financial Economics,1997,44:229-239.
[42]Shropshire C.The role of the interlocking director and board receptivity in the diffusion of practices[J].Academy of Management Review,2010,35(2):246-264.
[43]Silva F,et al.Family ties,interlocking directorates and performance of business groups in emerging countries:The case of Chile[J].Journal of Business Research,2006,59(3):315-321.
[44]Thomas K and Robert G.Interlocking corporate directorships as a social network[J].American Journal of Economics and Sociology,1981,40(1):37-50.
[45]Thomas,et al.Models of significance of interlocking corporate directorates[J].American Journal of Economics and Sociology,1979,38(2):173-186.
[46]Uzzi B.Social structure and competition in interfirm networks:The paradox of embeddedness[J].Administrative Science Quarterly,1997,42(3):35-67.
[47]Uzzi B and Gillespie J J.Knowledge spillover in corporate financing networks:Embeddedness and the form's debt performance[J].Strategic Management Journal,2002,23(7):595-618.
[48]Wasserman S and Faust K.Social network analysis:Methods and applications[M].New York:Cambridge University Press,1994.
[49]Yeo H-J,et al.CEO reciprocal interlocks in French corporations[J].Journal of Management and Governance,2003,7(1):87-108.
[50]Yermack D.Remuneration,retention,and reputation incentives for outside directors[J].Journal of Finance,2004,59(5):2281-2308.
[51]Zaheer A and Bell G G.Benefiting from network position:Firm capabilities,structural holes,and performance[J].Strategic Management Journal,2005,26(9):809-825.
引用本文
张祥建, 郭岚. 国外连锁董事网络研究述评与未来展望[J]. 外国经济与管理, 2014, 36(5): 69–80.
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