代理成本与审计师选择——基于中国IPO公司的研究
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财经研究 2006 年 第 32 卷第 04 期, 页码：93 - 104
摘要
参考文献
摘要
西方大量研究表明,公司的代理冲突程度越高,选择大事务所进行审计的动力就越强。文章在对179家IPO公司研究后发现,建立在英美市场经济条件下的代理理论对我国审计师选择行为的解释力并不充分。在公司规模、成长性、财务杠杆、管理层持股比例、董事会独立性等反映公司代理冲突的变量中,仅公司规模与是否选择大事务所进行审计有显著正向关系,管理层持股与是否选择大事务所审计则呈倒U形关系,没有发现成长性、财务杠杆与审计师选择存在显著关系的证据。
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[2]DeAngelo L.Auditor size and audit quality[J].Journal of Accounting and Economics,1981,3(12):183~199.
[3]DeFond M L.The Association between changes in client firm agency costs and auditorswitching[J].Auditing,1992,11(1):16~31.
[4]Eichenseher J W,P Danos.The analysis of industry-specific auditor concentration:To-wards an explanatory model[J].The Accounting Review,1981,56(3):479~492.
[5]Eichenseher J W,M Hagigi,D Shields.Market reaction to auditor changes by OTCcompanies[J].Auditing,1989,9(1):29~40.
[6]Fama E F.Agency problems and theory of the firm[J].Journal of Political Economy,1980,88(2):288~307.
[7]Fama E F,M C Jensen.Separation of ownership and control[J].Journal of Law and E-conomics,1983,26(2):301~325.
[8]Firth M,A Smith.Selection of auditor firms by companies in the new issue market[J].Applied Economics,1992,24:247~255.
[9]Francis J R,E R Wilson.Auditor changes:A joint test of theories relating to agencycosts and auditor differentiation[J].The Accounting Review,1988,63(4):663~682.
[10]Inderst R,H M Muller.Ownership concentration,monitoring,and the agency cost ofdebt[EB/OL].Working Paper,http://www.ssrn.com,1999-12-16.
[11]Jensen M C,W H Meckling.Theory of the firm:Managerial behavior,agency costsand ownership structure[J].Journal of Financial Economics,1976,3(4):305~360.
[12]Jensen M C.Agency costs of free cash flow,corporate finance,and takeovers[J].A-merican Economic Review,1986,76(2):323~329.
[13]Jensen M C.The modern industrial revolution,exit,and the failure of internal controlsystem[J].The Journal of Finance,1993,48:831~880.
[14]Johnson W B,T Lys.The market for audit services:Evidence from voluntary auditorchanges[J].Journal of Accounting and Economics,1990,(1):281~308.
[15]Menon K,D D Williams.Auditor credibility and initial public offerings[J].Account-ing Review,1991,66(2):313~332
[16]Piot C.Agency costs and audit quality:Evidence from France[J].The European Ac-counting Review,2001,10(3):461~499.
[17]李树华.审计独立性的提高与审计市场的背离[M].上海:上海三联书店,2000.
[18]吴溪.我国证券市场审计师变更的若干特征分析[J].中国注册会计师,2002,(1):27~30.
[19]徐冰.湖北家族企业审计需求实证研究[J].审计月刊,2004,(5):14~15.
[20]王济川,郭志刚.Logistic回归模型———方法与应用[M].北京:高等教育出版社,2001.
引用本文
李明辉. 代理成本与审计师选择——基于中国IPO公司的研究[J]. 财经研究, 2006, 32(4): 93–104.
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