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6909党组织通过“双向进入、交叉任职”参与国有企业经营决策是我国特有的制度安排，这一制度安排是否会增加国有企业对高质量审计的需求?文章以2006-2012年国有
国有企业党组织治理的信号传递效应—基于审计师选择的分析
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参考文献
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程博, 宣扬, 潘飞. 国有企业党组织治理的信号传递效应—基于审计师选择的分析[J]. 财经研究, 2017, 43(3): 69–80.
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