中国股市现金股利悖论研究
5711 
2285
财经研究 2005 年 第 31 卷第 06 期, 页码：133 - 145
摘要
参考文献
摘要
现金股利悖论指现金股利增加或降低都可能增加代理成本,从而损害中小投资者利益。现金股利能保护中小投资者利益是国内外流行的观点。文章在考虑我国存在高比例非流通股的事实下,从代理成本角度对我国现金股利与中小投资者利益关系进行了系统的理论分析,提出了“现金股利悖论”,并得出三条推论:股权越集中的公司,现金股利支付率越高;国有股股东比法人股股东更偏好现金股利;现金股利支付极不稳定。但对三条推论的检验结果表明,在未考虑其他影响因素时国有股股东与法人股股东对现金股利的偏好并无显著差别。增加现金股利的一刀切的做法并不可取。要解决现金股利的两难处境,前提是股票全流通。
关键词
[1]DewenterK ,WartherV Dividends, asymmetric information, and agency conflicts:Evidence from a comparison of the dividend policies ofJapanese andU S firms[J]TheJournal ofFinance,1998,Vol53,879~904
[2]Easterbrook,Frank.Two agency cost explanations of dividends[J]AmericanEconomicReview,1984,74,650~659
[3]Healy,Paul,KrishnaPalepu.Earnings information conveyed by dividend initiations andomissions[J]Journal ofFinancialEconomics,1988,21,149~175
[4]Jensen,M Agency costs of free cash flow,corporate finance, and takeovers[J]TheA mericanEconomicReview,1986,Vol76,Iss2,323~329
[5]Jensen,MichaelC ,WilliamH Meckling.Theory of the firm:Managerial behavior,a gency costs, and ownership structure[J]Journal ofFinancialEconomics,1976,3,305~360
[6]LaPorta,Rafael,FlorencioLopez deSilanes,AndreiShleifer,RobertW Vishny.A gency problems and dividend policies around the world[J].TheJournal ofFinance,Cambridge,2000,Vol55,Iss1,1~33
[7]Moh d,MahmoudA,Perry,LarryL,Rimbey,JamesN An investigation of the dy namic relationship between agency theory and dividend policy[J].TheFinancialRe view,1995,Vol30,Iss2,367~385
[8]Zwiebel,J Dynamic capital structure under managerial entrenchment[J]AmericanE conomicReview,1996,86,1197~1215
[9]陈伟,刘星,杨源新.上海股票市场股利政策信息传递效应的实证研究[J]中国管理科学,1999,(3).
[10]何涛,陈晓.现金股利能否提高企业的市场价值[J]金融研究,2002,(8).
[11]苏月中股利代理理论研究综述[J]经济学动态,2004,(10).
[12]万鹏忽视投资回报等于扼杀市场生命力[N]证券时报,20040921.
[13]王信从代理理论看上市公司的派现行为[J]金融研究,2002,(9)
[14]原红旗中国上市公司股利政策分析[J].财经研究,2001,(3).
[2]Easterbrook,Frank.Two agency cost explanations of dividends[J]AmericanEconomicReview,1984,74,650~659
[3]Healy,Paul,KrishnaPalepu.Earnings information conveyed by dividend initiations andomissions[J]Journal ofFinancialEconomics,1988,21,149~175
[4]Jensen,M Agency costs of free cash flow,corporate finance, and takeovers[J]TheA mericanEconomicReview,1986,Vol76,Iss2,323~329
[5]Jensen,MichaelC ,WilliamH Meckling.Theory of the firm:Managerial behavior,a gency costs, and ownership structure[J]Journal ofFinancialEconomics,1976,3,305~360
[6]LaPorta,Rafael,FlorencioLopez deSilanes,AndreiShleifer,RobertW Vishny.A gency problems and dividend policies around the world[J].TheJournal ofFinance,Cambridge,2000,Vol55,Iss1,1~33
[7]Moh d,MahmoudA,Perry,LarryL,Rimbey,JamesN An investigation of the dy namic relationship between agency theory and dividend policy[J].TheFinancialRe view,1995,Vol30,Iss2,367~385
[8]Zwiebel,J Dynamic capital structure under managerial entrenchment[J]AmericanE conomicReview,1996,86,1197~1215
[9]陈伟,刘星,杨源新.上海股票市场股利政策信息传递效应的实证研究[J]中国管理科学,1999,(3).
[10]何涛,陈晓.现金股利能否提高企业的市场价值[J]金融研究,2002,(8).
[11]苏月中股利代理理论研究综述[J]经济学动态,2004,(10).
[12]万鹏忽视投资回报等于扼杀市场生命力[N]证券时报,20040921.
[13]王信从代理理论看上市公司的派现行为[J]金融研究,2002,(9)
[14]原红旗中国上市公司股利政策分析[J].财经研究,2001,(3).
引用本文
徐国祥, 苏月中. 中国股市现金股利悖论研究[J]. 财经研究, 2005, 31(6): 133–145.
导出参考文献，格式为：
