共享资源自发供给制度的产生——一个动态演化模型解释
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财经研究 2005 年 第 31 卷第 07 期, 页码：7 - 17
摘要
参考文献
摘要
回顾经济学考察共享资源供给制度的理论模型(经典的和演化博弈方法)和个案调查的工作,针对共享资源自发供给发生这一类经典模型无法解释的动态过程,文章借鉴演化动力学模型,赋予合作与搭便车两类不同个体对共享资源具有不同的边际效用,即解释部分个体“利他”行为特征,采用群体繁衍时个体策略类型能被选择、保留和延续的动态处理,推导合作策略稳定收敛(共享资源产生自发供给)的条件———合作的边际效用大于非合作边际效用与合作成本之和,进而得出若干一般性的推论。
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[2]德姆塞茨·H.关于产权的理论[A].R·科斯.财产权利与制度变迁[C].上海:上海三联书店,1994.
[3]霍布斯.利维坦[M].(黎思复、黎廷弼译)北京:商务印书馆,1985.
[4]哈耶克.自由秩序原理[M].(邓正来译)北京:三联书店,1997.
[5]加里·D·利贝卡普.产权的缔约分析[M].(陈宇东等译)北京:中国社会科学出版社,1999.
[6]迈克尔·麦金尼斯.多中心治道与发展[M].(王文章、毛寿龙译校)上海:上海三联书店,2000.
[7]青木昌彦.比较制度分析[M].(周黎安译)上海:上海远东出版社,2001.
[8]汪丁丁.启蒙死了,启蒙万岁!———评汪晖关于“中国问题”的叙说[J].战略与管理,1999,(3).
[9]朱宪辰.业主自治的制度缺陷[N].南方周末,20030313.
[10]AndreoniJ.Givingwithimpurealtruism:ApplicationstocharityandRicardianequiv alence[J].JournalofPoliticalEconomy,1989,(47):1447～1458.
[11]BalandJean Marie,Jean PhilippePlatteau.Collectiveactiononthecommons:The roleofinequality[R].CRED.Belogium:UniversityofNamur,2002.
[12]BergstromTC.Evolutionofsocialbehavior:Individualandgroupselection[J].Jour nalofEconomicPerspectives,2002,16,(2):67～88.
[13]BoadwayR,PestieauP,WildasinD.Tax transferpoliciesandthevoluntaryprovision ofpublicgoods[J].JournalofPublicEconomics,1989,(39):157～175.
[14]BolnickDR.Collectivegoodsprovisionthroughcommunitydevelopment[J].Eco nomicDevelopmentandCulturalChange,1976,(25):137～150.
[15]BuchananJM.Conflictandcooperationinpublicgoodsinteraction[J].WesternEco nomicJournal,1967,(5):109～121.
[16]CohenD,IEshel.Onthefoundereffectandtheevolutionofaltruistictraits[J].The oreticalPopulationBiology,1976,(10):276～302.
[17]FerejohnJA,NollRG.Anexperimentalmarketforpublicgoods:ThePBSstation programcooperative[J].AmericanEconomicReviewPapersandProceedings,1976,(66):267～273.
[18]HardinGarrett.TheTragedyoftheCommons[J].Science,1968,(162):1243～1248.
[19]HaldaneJBS.TheCausesofEvolution[M].NewYorkandLondon:Harper&Brothers,1932.
[20]JohansenL.Thetheoryofpublicgoods:Misplacedemphasis?[J].JournalofPublic Economics,1977,(7):145～152.
[21]KikuchiM,DozinaG,HayamiY.Economicsofcommunityworkprograms:Acom munalirrigationprojectsinthePhilippines[J].EconomicDevelopmentandCultural Change1978,(26):211～225.
[22]KrepsDM,FudenbergD.Reputationinthesimultaneous,playofmultipleopponents[J].ReviewofEconomicStudies,1987,(54):541～568.
[23]LoreM.Ruttan.GamesandtheCPRToolkit[J].TheCommonPropertyResource Digest,QuarterlyPublicationoftheInternationalAssociationfortheStudyofCommon Property,2000,(55).
[24]MarchandM.Prixinternesetallocationdesresourcesauseinl'universite[J].Re cherchesEconomiquesdeLouvain,1972,(38):314～363.
[25]MaynardSmithJ.GroupSelectionandKinSelection[J].Nature,1964,(201):1145～1147.
[26]MuellerDC.PublicChoiceⅡ[M].Combridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,1989.
[27]NagauPM.Tensionsinemployment:Theexperienceoftheharambeeselfhelp movementinKenya[J].EconomicDevelopmentandCulturalChange,1987,(35):523～538.
[28]OlsonM.Thelogicofcollectiveaction[M].Cambridge,Mass:HarvardUniversity Press,1965.
[29]OstromE.Governingthecommons:Theevaluationofinstitutionsforcollectiveaction[M].Cambridge,UK:CambridgeUniversityPress,1990.
[30]OstromE,GardnerR,WalkerJRules.GamesandCommon PoolResources[C].AnnArbor:UniversityofMichiganPress,1994.
[31]SamuelsonPA.Thepuretheoryofpublicexpenditure[J].ReviewofEconomicsand Statistics,1954,(36):387～389.
[32]SamuelsonPA.Diagrammaticexpositionofatheoryofpublicexpenditure[J].Re viewofEconomicsandStatistics,1955,(37):350～356.
[33]SamuelsonPA.Aspectsofpublicexpendituretheories[J].ReviewofEconomicsand Statistics,1958,(40):332～338.
[34]SchoumakerF.Revelationdespreferencesetplanification:Uneapproachestrategique[J].RecherchesEconomiquesdeLouvain,1977,(43):245～259.
[35]SugdenR.Ontheeconomicsofphilanthropy[J].EconomicJournal,1982,(92):341～350.
[36]SugdenR.Reciprocity:Thesupplyofpublicgoodsthroughvoluntarycontributions[J].EconomicJournal,1984,(94):772～787.
[37]StiglerGJ.Free ridersandcollectiveaction:Anappendixtotheoriesofeconomic regulation[J].BellJournalofEconomics,1974,(5):359～365.
[38]UmbeckJohnR.Mightmakesright:AtheoryoftheformationandInitialdistribu tionofpropertyrights[J].EconomicInquiry,1981,19(1):38～59.
[39]WadeR.Villagerepublics:EconomicconditionsforcollectiveactioninsouthIndia[M].Cambridge,UK:CambridgeUniversityPress,1987.
[40]YoungDJ.A''fairshare''modelofpublicgoodprovision[J].JournalofEconomicBe haviorandOrganization,1989,(11):137～147.
[41]YuvalShilony.Diversityandingenuityinvoluntarycollectiveaction[J].European JournalofPoliticalEconomy,2000,16:429～443.
引用本文
朱宪辰, 章平. 共享资源自发供给制度的产生——一个动态演化模型解释[J]. 财经研究, 2005, 31(7): 7–17.
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