诚信、代理成本与家族企业的经理选择
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财经研究 2004 年 第 30 卷第 02 期, 页码：51 - 58
摘要
参考文献
摘要
文章构建了家族企业与职业经理的博弈模型,将法律环境、企业资产的特性、职业经理背叛的一次性收益、集体惩戒机制、经理的耐心和代理关系的不确定性作为影响职业经理诚信的因素纳入模型。这些因素通过影响企业为诱使职业经理守信而必须向其支付的效率工资,进而影响雇用职业经理的代理成本。雇用职业经理带来的企业总收益的增加与其所引起的代理成本一起决定了企业雇用职业经理的临界规模。由此得出文章的核心命题:尽管职业经理的能力与家庭成员相比可能更强,但只有当企业规模大于临界规模时,企业才会选择雇用职业经理。
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[3]RossS,Theeconomicstheoryofagency:Theprincipalsproblems[J] AmericanEconomicReview,1973,62:134～139.
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[5]JensenM,WMecking.Theoryofthefirm:Managerialbehavior,agencycosts,andcapitalstructure[J] JournalofFinancialEconomics,1976,3:305～360.
[6]MirrleesJ,Theoptimalstructureofincentivesandauthoritywithinanorganization[J] BellJournalofEconomics,1976,7:105～131.
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[9]Johnson,Simon,RafaelLaPortaFlorencioLopez de Silanes,etal.Tunneling[J] AmericanEconomicReview(PapersandProceedings),2000,90:22～27.
[10]Burkatr,Panunzi,Shleifer.Familyfirms[R] DiscussionPaper,2002,No.1944,HarvardInstituteforEconomicRdsearch.
[11]BhattacharyaU,BRavikumar.Capitalmarketsandtheevolutionoffamilybusinesses[J]JournalofBusiness,2001,74:187～220.
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[15]彼得·德鲁克 大变革时代的管理[M] 上海:上海译文出版社,1999.
引用本文
卓越, 张珉. 诚信、代理成本与家族企业的经理选择[J]. 财经研究, 2004, 30(2): 51–58.
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