不对称的声誉机制与独立董事市场需求——来自中国A股ST公司的经验证据
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财经研究 2014 年 第 40 卷第 04 期, 页码：66 - 78
摘要
参考文献
摘要
根据独立董事的功能,独立董事的声誉包括咨询声誉与监督声誉两方面。文章以在ST公司任职来反映独立董事两方面声誉同时受损,利用2002-2012年沪深两市A股公司数据研究发现:ST公司的独立董事未来同一时期所兼任的上市公司数量会减少,而且如果ST公司在其任期内未能成功"摘帽",则其所兼任的上市公司数量会进一步减少;但同时,ST公司的独立董事未来仍可能获得新的上市公司聘请,而且聘请ST公司独立董事的上市公司大股东控制权收益较高。文章研究表明,中国独立董事市场确实排斥声誉受损的董事,但对声誉机制也存在负向需求,即如果公司希望较少受到监督,则它们可能主动追逐监督声誉较差的独立董事。
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[2]李增泉,孙铮,王志伟.“掏空”与所有权安排[J].会计研究,2004,(12):3-13.
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[4]刘浩,唐松,楼俊.独立董事:监督还是咨询?[J].管理世界,2012,(1):141-156.
[5]刘浩,赵良玉,刘芬芬.控制权收益与董事会结构调整选择——基于证监会强制引入独立董事的研究[J].中国会计与财务研究,2013,(3):1-71.
[6]宁向东,崔弼洙,张颖.基于声誉的独立董事行为研究[J].清华大学学报:哲学社会科学版,2012,(1):129-136.
[7]唐清泉,罗党论,王莉.上市公司独立董事辞职行为研究——基于前景理论的分析[J].南开管理评论,2006,(1):74-83.
[8]吴斌,翁恺宁.基于控制权收益的大股东与公司治理关系分析:文献综述[J].世界经济文汇,2003,(2):71-80.
[9]叶康涛,祝继高,陆正飞,等.独立董事的独立性:基于董事会投票的证据[J].经济研究,2011,(1):126-139.
[10]支晓强,童盼.盈余管理、控制权转移与独立董事变更——兼论独立董事治理作用的发挥[J].管理世界,2005,(11):137-144.
[11]周繁,谭劲松,简宇寅.声誉激励还是经济激励——独立董事“跳槽”的实证研究[J].中国会计评论,2008,(2):177-192.
[12]Adams R,Hermalin B,Weisbach M.The role of boards of directors in corporate governance:A conceptual framework and survey[J].Journal of Economic Literature,2010,48(1):58-107.
[13]Brickley J,Coles J,Linck J.What happens to CEOs after they retire?New evidence on career concerns,horizon problems,and CEO incentives[J].Journal of Financial Economics,1990,52(3):341-377.
[14]Cheung S.The contractual nature of the firm[J].Journal of Law and Economics,1983,26(1):1-21.
[15]Demb A,Neubauer F.The corporate board:Confronting the paradoxes[M].Oxford:Oxford University Press,1992.
[16]Fama E,Jensen M.Separation of ownership and control[J].Journal of Low and Economics,1983,26(2):301-325.
[17]Fich E,Shivdasani A.Financial fraud,director reputation,and shareholder wealth[J].Journal of Financial Economics,2007,86(2):306-336.
[18]Gilson S.Bankruptcy,boards,banks,and blockholders:Evidence on changes in corporate ownership and control when firms default[J].Journal of Financial Economics,1990,27(2):355-387.
[19]Harford J.Takeover bids and target directors incentives:The impact of a bid on director’s wealth and board seats[J].Journal of Financial Economics,2003,69(1):51-83.
[20]Heckman J.Sample selection bias as a specification error[J].Econometrica,1979,47(1):153-161.
[21]Hermalin B,Weisbach M.Endogenously chosen boards of directors and their monitoring of CEO[J].American Economic Review,1998,88(1):96-118.
[22]Jiang G,Lee C,Yue H.Tunneling through intercorporate loans:The China experience[J].Journal of Financial Economics,2010,98(1):1-20.
[23]Kaplan S,Reishus D.Outside directorships and corporate performance[J].Journal of Financial Economics,1990,27(2):389-410.
[24]OECD.Corporate governance of listed companies in China[R].OECD Publishing,http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264119208-en,2011.
[25]Ryan H,Wiggins R.Who is in whose pockets?Director compensation,board independence,and barriers to effective monitoring[J].Journal of Financial Economics,2004,73(3):497-524.
[26]Yermack D.Remuneration,retention,and reputation incentives for outside directors[J].Journal of Finance,2004,59(5):2281-2308.
引用本文
刘浩, 李灏, 金娟. 不对称的声誉机制与独立董事市场需求——来自中国A股ST公司的经验证据[J]. 财经研究, 2014, 40(4): 66–78.
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