激励扭曲与努力的无效分配——基于银行客户经理制模拟利润考核的有效性分析
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财经研究 2007 年 第 33 卷第 03 期, 页码：39 - 47
摘要
参考文献
摘要
文章首先通过运用多任务委托代理模型分析商业银行模拟利润考核制度的激励效应和扭曲效应,以及可能导致客户经理努力的无效分配;然后扩展分析银行模拟利润考核的有效性和模拟利润成本之间的权衡以及模拟利润的最优精确水平;最后结合我国商业银行的现实状况引申出与商业银行客户经理模拟利润考核制度相关的结论与政策建议。
④标准化的具体的方式参见Baker(1992)。
⑤本文在基本建模思想上还参考了Baker(2002)的分析,特别是如何解决存在激励扭曲下的最优激励问题。
[1]Baker George P.Incentive contracts and performance measurement[J].Journal of Polit-ical Economy,1992,6:598-614.
[2]Baker G,Gibbons R,Murphy Kevin J.Subjective performance measures in opti mal In-centive contracts[J].Quarterly Journal of Economics,1994,11:1125-1156.
[3]Baker George P.The use of performance measures in incentive contracting[J].Ameri-can Economic Review,2000,5:415-420.
[4]Baker George P.Distortion and risk in opti mal incentive contracts[J].Journal of Hu-man Resources,2002,4:728-750.
[5]Feltham G,Xie J.Performance measure congruity and diversity in multi-task principal/agent Relations[J].The Accounting Review,1994,7:429-453.
[6]Hol mstromB,MilgromP.Multitask principal agent Analyses:Incentive contracts,asset own-ership andjob design[J].Journal of Law,Economics and Organization,1991,7:24-52.
[7]Kerr S.On the folly of rewarding a while hoping for B[J].Academy of ManagementJournal,1975,12:769-783.
[8]Schnedler W.On the prudence of rewarding a while hoping for B[J].IZA DiscussionPapers,2003:765.
[9]陈学彬,张文.完善我国商业银行激励约束机制的博弈分析[J].国际金融研究,2003,(3):12-17.
[10]陈弘,朱光华.期权激励扭曲:过程、原因与培训[J].中国经济问题,2003,(1):42-48.
[11]傅卫锋,周迎春.浅谈商业银行客户经理的绩效考核[J].新疆金融,2005,(3):31-33.
[12]霍毅芳.股票期权激励机制的扭曲与股票期权会计处理问题探讨[J].中共山西省委党校学报,2005,(1):60-61.
⑤本文在基本建模思想上还参考了Baker(2002)的分析,特别是如何解决存在激励扭曲下的最优激励问题。
[1]Baker George P.Incentive contracts and performance measurement[J].Journal of Polit-ical Economy,1992,6:598-614.
[2]Baker G,Gibbons R,Murphy Kevin J.Subjective performance measures in opti mal In-centive contracts[J].Quarterly Journal of Economics,1994,11:1125-1156.
[3]Baker George P.The use of performance measures in incentive contracting[J].Ameri-can Economic Review,2000,5:415-420.
[4]Baker George P.Distortion and risk in opti mal incentive contracts[J].Journal of Hu-man Resources,2002,4:728-750.
[5]Feltham G,Xie J.Performance measure congruity and diversity in multi-task principal/agent Relations[J].The Accounting Review,1994,7:429-453.
[6]Hol mstromB,MilgromP.Multitask principal agent Analyses:Incentive contracts,asset own-ership andjob design[J].Journal of Law,Economics and Organization,1991,7:24-52.
[7]Kerr S.On the folly of rewarding a while hoping for B[J].Academy of ManagementJournal,1975,12:769-783.
[8]Schnedler W.On the prudence of rewarding a while hoping for B[J].IZA DiscussionPapers,2003:765.
[9]陈学彬,张文.完善我国商业银行激励约束机制的博弈分析[J].国际金融研究,2003,(3):12-17.
[10]陈弘,朱光华.期权激励扭曲:过程、原因与培训[J].中国经济问题,2003,(1):42-48.
[11]傅卫锋,周迎春.浅谈商业银行客户经理的绩效考核[J].新疆金融,2005,(3):31-33.
[12]霍毅芳.股票期权激励机制的扭曲与股票期权会计处理问题探讨[J].中共山西省委党校学报,2005,(1):60-61.
引用本文
易行健, 张德常. 激励扭曲与努力的无效分配——基于银行客户经理制模拟利润考核的有效性分析[J]. 财经研究, 2007, 33(3): 39–47.
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