不完全合同框架下公私合作制的创新激励——基于公共服务供给的社会福利创新条件分析
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财经研究 2009 年 第 35 卷第 08 期, 页码：80 - 91
摘要
参考文献
摘要
公私合作制作为一种有别于传统模式的公共服务供给机制,将基础设施项目的建设和运营同时交由一个公私合作制联合体负责。文章基于不完全合同框架分析了公私合作制更有利于激励基础设施项目建设及运营中增进公共服务供给的社会福利的创新的条件,并得出建设创新对于运营收益的外部性,创新的社会价值与经济价值之间的一致性,以及公共部门和私人部门的创新能力对比是重要的影响因素。此外,文章还指出政府在建立公私合作制时必须考虑包括缔约成本及合同风险在内的其他权衡因素。
②PFI是Private Finance Initiative的简称。它可看作是PPP的一种典型形式。关于PFI的内容可参见Grout(1997)及HM Treasury(1998)。
③王灏(2004)对PPP的定义及分类标准进行了较为系统的归纳总结。
④对于这一假定的说明,参见Hart(2003)。
⑤关于不可缔约的原因,参见Tirole(1999)。
⑥关于预算软约束的内容,参见Kornai,Maskin和Roland(2003)。
[1]Bajari P,Tadelis S.Incentives versus transaction costs:Atheory of procurement con-tracts[J].RANDJournal of Economics,2001,32:387-407.
[2]Bennett J,Iossa E.Building and managing facilities for public services[J].Journal ofPublic Economics,2006,90:2143-2160.
[3]Grout Paul A.The economics of the private finance initiative[J].Oxford Reviewof E-conomic Policy,1997,13:53-66.
[4]Guasch J L,Laffont J J,Straub S.Renegotiation of concession contracts in Latin A-merica[R].World Bank Research Paper,2003,3011.
[5]Hart O,Shleifer A,Vishny R.The proper scope of government:Theory and an appli-cation to prisons[J].Quarterly Journal of Economics,1997,CXII:1119-1158.
[6]Hart O.Incomplete contracts and public ownership:Remarks and an application topublic-private partnership[J].Economic Journal,2003,113:69-76.
[7]International Monetary Fund.Public-private partnerships,government guarantees,andfiscal risk[M].Washington:International Monetary Fund,2006.
[8]Levin,J,Tadelis S.Contracting for government services:Theory and evidence fromthe U.S.cities[R].2007,Working Paper.
[9]Marti mort D,Pouyet J.To build or not to build:Normative and positive theories ofpublic-private partnerships[J].International Journal of Industrial Organization,2008,26:393-411.
[10]Williamson O E.The economic institutions of capitalism[M].New York:Free Press,1985.
③王灏(2004)对PPP的定义及分类标准进行了较为系统的归纳总结。
④对于这一假定的说明,参见Hart(2003)。
⑤关于不可缔约的原因,参见Tirole(1999)。
⑥关于预算软约束的内容,参见Kornai,Maskin和Roland(2003)。
[1]Bajari P,Tadelis S.Incentives versus transaction costs:Atheory of procurement con-tracts[J].RANDJournal of Economics,2001,32:387-407.
[2]Bennett J,Iossa E.Building and managing facilities for public services[J].Journal ofPublic Economics,2006,90:2143-2160.
[3]Grout Paul A.The economics of the private finance initiative[J].Oxford Reviewof E-conomic Policy,1997,13:53-66.
[4]Guasch J L,Laffont J J,Straub S.Renegotiation of concession contracts in Latin A-merica[R].World Bank Research Paper,2003,3011.
[5]Hart O,Shleifer A,Vishny R.The proper scope of government:Theory and an appli-cation to prisons[J].Quarterly Journal of Economics,1997,CXII:1119-1158.
[6]Hart O.Incomplete contracts and public ownership:Remarks and an application topublic-private partnership[J].Economic Journal,2003,113:69-76.
[7]International Monetary Fund.Public-private partnerships,government guarantees,andfiscal risk[M].Washington:International Monetary Fund,2006.
[8]Levin,J,Tadelis S.Contracting for government services:Theory and evidence fromthe U.S.cities[R].2007,Working Paper.
[9]Marti mort D,Pouyet J.To build or not to build:Normative and positive theories ofpublic-private partnerships[J].International Journal of Industrial Organization,2008,26:393-411.
[10]Williamson O E.The economic institutions of capitalism[M].New York:Free Press,1985.
引用本文
赖丹馨, 费方域. 不完全合同框架下公私合作制的创新激励——基于公共服务供给的社会福利创新条件分析[J]. 财经研究, 2009, 35(8): 80–91.
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