控制权收益、道德风险与软预算约束
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财经研究 2010 年 第 36 卷第 05 期, 页码：124 - 133
摘要
参考文献
摘要
Dewatripont-Maskin(1995)将软预算约束描述为一种"事前无效,事后有效"的动态激励问题,认为信贷的分散化有助于消除软预算约束。文章在DM(1995)模型基础上引入控制权收益变量,论证了"事前无效,事后也无效"软预算约束的存在条件,指出这种软预算约束本质上是控制权人追求私人收益的道德风险行为。信贷的分散化不足以消除事后无效率的软预算约束。完善的公司治理机制和法律机制是减少事后无效率软预算约束的有效途径。
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[4]Dyck Alexander,Luigi Zingales.Private benefits of control:Aninternational comparison[J].Journal of Finance,2004,59(2):537-600.
[5]Shleifer,Andrei,Robert W Vishny.Asurvey of corporate control[J].Journal of Politi-cal Economy,1997,94:461-488.
[6]Qian Yingyi,Chenggang Xu.Innovation and Bureaucracy under soft and hard budgetconstraints[J].The Reviewof Economic Studies,1998,65(1):151-64.
引用本文
李双金, 郑育家. 控制权收益、道德风险与软预算约束[J]. 财经研究, 2010, 36(5): 124–133.
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