道德风险与存款保险额度的市场决定
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财经研究 2006 年 第 32 卷第 01 期, 页码：75 - 85
摘要
参考文献
摘要
中国建成何种存款保险制度模式将直接影响到银行行为和金融稳定。存款保险具有诱发银行从事更高风险经营的制度激励。为此,实践中许多经济体对存款保额人为设定上限。但总体上不是降低而是加大了银行体系的不稳定性。而保额如果由市场内生决定,则能够摆脱人为确定保额的困境。在金融业相对稳定的背景下,中国存款保险制度建设应该发挥后发优势,利用市场决定保额以尽量增加市场约束力。而且操作上也较为简单易行,并可与其他金融改革和制度建设互动进行。
[1]Demirguc-Kun Asli,Detragiache Enrica.Does deposit insurance increase banking systemstability[R].IMF Working Paper,2000.
[2]Demirguc-Kunt,Detragiache.The determinants of banking crises in developing and de-veloped countries[R].IMF Staff Paper,1998.
[3]Reza Vaez-Zadeh,Danyang Xie,Edda Zoli.MODIS:A market-oriented deposit insurancescheme[R].IMF Working Paper,2002,December.
[4]Robert Cull.How deposit insurance affects financial depth:A cross-country analysis[R].Policy Research Working Paper 1875,World Bank,1998,January.
[5]Robert Cull,Lemma W Senbet,Marco Sorge.Deposit insurance and financial develop-ment[J].Journal of Money,Credit,and Banking,2005,(2):43~82.
[6]何光辉,杨咸月.即将变革的美国联邦存款保险制度[J].国际金融研究,2001,(12):31~36.
[7]何光辉.存款保险制度研究[M].北京:中国金融出版社,2003:161~162.to reduce moral hazard.Because of its shortfalls,DIS leads to higher rather thanlower banking system instability.A new DIS,which coverage is determined by themarket equilibrium between demand and supply,can help go out dilemmas led byartificial coverage.Under the background of financial relative stabilization,advanta-ges of coverage determined in market in DIS should be taken to increase marketdiscipline in China which should have post-development advantages.Furthermore,the new DIS is easily feasible and practice with other financial reforms and institu-tional constructions.
[2]Demirguc-Kunt,Detragiache.The determinants of banking crises in developing and de-veloped countries[R].IMF Staff Paper,1998.
[3]Reza Vaez-Zadeh,Danyang Xie,Edda Zoli.MODIS:A market-oriented deposit insurancescheme[R].IMF Working Paper,2002,December.
[4]Robert Cull.How deposit insurance affects financial depth:A cross-country analysis[R].Policy Research Working Paper 1875,World Bank,1998,January.
[5]Robert Cull,Lemma W Senbet,Marco Sorge.Deposit insurance and financial develop-ment[J].Journal of Money,Credit,and Banking,2005,(2):43~82.
[6]何光辉,杨咸月.即将变革的美国联邦存款保险制度[J].国际金融研究,2001,(12):31~36.
[7]何光辉.存款保险制度研究[M].北京:中国金融出版社,2003:161~162.to reduce moral hazard.Because of its shortfalls,DIS leads to higher rather thanlower banking system instability.A new DIS,which coverage is determined by themarket equilibrium between demand and supply,can help go out dilemmas led byartificial coverage.Under the background of financial relative stabilization,advanta-ges of coverage determined in market in DIS should be taken to increase marketdiscipline in China which should have post-development advantages.Furthermore,the new DIS is easily feasible and practice with other financial reforms and institu-tional constructions.
引用本文
何光辉. 道德风险与存款保险额度的市场决定[J]. 财经研究, 2006, 32(1): 75–85.
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