监管机构间博弈的金融监管非均衡与系统风险研究
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财经研究 2011 年 第 37 卷第 02 期, 页码：28 - 38
摘要
参考文献
摘要
文章通过对金融监管者之间的博弈行为研究发现,分业监管体制下监管机构之间的监管合作成本是导致监管制度漏洞的重要因素。以金融监管机构之间博弈为基础的监管者与金融机构的博弈结果显示,监管者可以通过对监管成本和处罚力度的动态调整实现监管博弈均衡。监管制度的均衡分析与微观形成机理结论的契合表明,降低监管成本比单纯加大对金融机构的处罚力度更有利于金融系统性风险的控制与化解。通过对美国应对2008年全球金融危机的金融监管实践分析和我国金融监管现状透视,模型结论得到了有效的印证。
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[2]廖凡.竞争、冲突与协调——金融混业监管模式的选择[J].北京大学学报,2008,(5):109-115.
[3]陈文君,李虹,杨文云.拼凑式金融混业监管模式的无缝化修正[J].财经论丛,2009,(6):51-57.
[4]Charle E Goodhart,Philip Hart mann,David T Llewellyn.Financial regulation:Why,howand where now?[R].Association with the Bank of England,1998.
[5]Kevin J stiroh,Adrienne Rumble.The dark side of diversification:The case U.S.finan-cial holding companies[J].Journal of Banking&Finance,2006,(8):2131-2161.
[6]Richard K Abrams,Michael WTaylor.Issues in the unification financial sector supervi-sion[R].I MF Working Paper,2000.
[7]Marianne Ojo.The growing i mportance of risk in regulation[J].Journal of Risk Fi-nance,2010,3:53-91.
[8]Fischer Black,Merton H Miller,Richard A Posner.An approach to the regulation ofbank holding companies[J].The Journal of Business,1978,51(3):379-412.
[9]Joan G Walters.Diversification of commercial bank and non Banking activities:Discus-sion[J].Journal of Finance,1975,2:303-305.
[10]Cartinhour G T.Federal regulation of group banking[J].Journal of Business of theUniversity of Chicago,1931,4(2):127-148.
[11]Viral V Acharya.Atheory of systemic risk and design of prudential bank regulation[J].Journal of Financial Stability,2009,5:224-255.
[12]Martin Cihak,Richard Podpiera.Integrated financial supervision:Which model?[J].North American Journal of Economics and Finance,2008,19:135-152.
[13]Howell E Jackson.The expanding obligations of financial holding companies[J].Har-vard Law Review,1994,(3):507-619.
引用本文
李成, 张炜, 匡桦. 监管机构间博弈的金融监管非均衡与系统风险研究[J]. 财经研究, 2011, 37(2): 28–38.
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