地方政府竞争、企业上市方式与政企间利益输送——来自中国家族企业上市公司的经验证据
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财经研究 2012 年 第 38 卷第 09 期, 页码：28 - 37
摘要
参考文献
摘要
中国转轨经济下的财政分权体制和政治晋升锦标赛激励地方政府官员将政策资源向有利于自身政绩的方向倾斜。文章研究发现,与买壳上市家族企业相比,直接上市家族企业获得了更多的银行贷款、政府补贴和税收优惠,但同时通过更高的资产回报、过度投资和负担更多的超额雇员服务于地方经济和社会目标。文章分析了地方政府热衷于推动新企业上市并给予大量政策扶持的原因,对于市场化进程中制定相关政策指导地方政府行为具有重要参考价值。
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[2]孙烨,罗党论.政府竞争、资本配置与上市公司“壳资源”转让[J].管理科学,2011,(1):11-20.
[3]周黎安.中国地方官员的晋升锦标赛模式研究[J].经济研究,2007,(7):36-50.
[4]周业安,冯兴元,赵坚毅.地方政府竞争与市场秩序的重构[J].中国社会科学,2004,(1):56-65.
[5]朱恒鹏.分权化改革、财政激励和公有制企业改制[J].世界经济,2004,(12):14-24.
[6]Adhikari A,Derashid C,Zhang H.Public policy,political connections,and effective taxrates:Longitudinal evidence from Malaysia[J].Journal of Accounting and Public Poli-cy,2006,25:574-595.
[7]Claessens S,Feijen E,Laeven L.Political connections and preferential access to finance:The role of campaign contributions[J].Journal of Financial Economics,2008,88:554-580.
[8]Francis B,Hasan I,Sun X.Political connections and the process of going public:Evi-dence from China[J].Journal of International Money and Finance,2009,28:696-719.
[9]Khwaja A,Mian A.Do lenders favor politically connected firms?Rent provision in anemerging financial market[J].Quarterly Journal of Economics,2005,120:1371-1411.
[10]Wei Z,Wu S,Li C,et al.Family control,institutional environment and cash dividendpolicy:Evidence from China[J].China Journal of Accounting Research,2011,4:29-46.
[11]Wu W,Wu C,Rui O.Ownership and the value of political connections[R].WorkingPaper,Shanghai Jiao Tong University,2010.
引用本文
黎文靖, 程敏英, 黄琼宇. 地方政府竞争、企业上市方式与政企间利益输送——来自中国家族企业上市公司的经验证据[J]. 财经研究, 2012, 38(9): 28–37.
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