经济新常态背景下企业金融化的负面影响日益显现。文章基于保险治理视角,研究董事高管责任保险对金融资产配置的抑制作用。研究发现,董事高管责任保险能够抑制金融资产配置;其作用机制是通过提高盈余信息质量与强化企业外部监督,降低信息不对称程度与代理成本,从而抑制金融资产配置。此外,董事高管责任保险能够提升实业投资及效率;董事高管责任保险主要对长期金融资产配置发挥抑制作用;董事高管责任保险的抑制作用在企业金融化监管政策实施后表现明显,准自然实验结果表明2014年加快发展责任保险政策能够增强董事高管责任保险的抑制作用。经济后果分析发现,董事高管责任保险对金融资产配置的抑制作用促使企业投资效率上升与经营风险下降。文章揭示了“保险合约”方式治理企业金融化趋势、降低代理成本的内在逻辑,为董事高管责任保险市场发展以及推动经济“脱虚向实”有所启示。
董事高管责任保险能够抑制金融资产配置吗?——来自2007-2019年非金融上市公司的经验证据
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董盈厚, 马亚民, 董馨格. 董事高管责任保险能够抑制金融资产配置吗?——来自2007-2019年非金融上市公司的经验证据[J]. 上海财经大学学报, 2021, 23(5): 65-80.
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