Management shareholding plan is an important part of modern corporate governance, and aims to combine management interests with shareholder wealth organically & achieve the governance goals of protecting the interests of investors and increasing the shareholder wealth constantly. In China, the state-owned corporate governance has many congenital defects, so the implementation of management shareholding plan has been given a more positive meaning. This paper explores the influence of the proportion of management shareholding on the costs of equity capital in the state-owned and non-state-owned holding states. It comes to the conclusions as follows:firstly, the design of the proportion of management shareholding and its changes are the key to the management shareholding plan, and have the direct impacts on corporate capital costs, thereby determining the changes in corporate comprehensive competitiveness; secondly, there are inverted U-shape relationships between the proportion of management shareholding and the costs of equity capital in both state-owned and non-state-owned listed companies; thirdly, capital costs are more sensitive to the changes in the proportion of management shareholding in state-owned listed companies than in non-state-owned listed companies. It shows that only the design of the proportion of management shareholding in accordance with changes in capital costs can guarantee the effectiveness of management shareholding plan and play the positive role. It provides listed companies with theoretical basis and constructive suggestions about the design of the proportion of management shareholding.