国外经理薪酬治理研究进展与评析——基于股东能动主义视角
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外国经济与管理 2011 年 第 33 卷第 04 期, 页码：51 - 58
摘要
参考文献
摘要
近年来,随着机构投资者活跃程度的显著提高以及"股东本位主义"思潮的回归,股东能动主义渐成趋势,已经发展成为英美等国公司治理机制的重要组成部分。本文主要对经理薪酬治理中股东能动主义兴起的现实背景、具体路径以及实际效果进行了评析,以期为我国国企高管薪酬改革与规制提供借鉴和启示。
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[4]Gillan,S L,and Starks,L T.Corporate governance proposals and shareholder activism:The role of institutional investors[J].Journal of Financial Economics,2000,57(2):275-305.
[5]Subramaniam,Chandra,and Wang,Frank.Performance-oriented shareholder proposals and CEO compensation[R].WorkingPaper,University of Texas,2010.
[6]Buchanan,B,Netter,J M,and Yang,T.Are shareholder proposals ani mportant corporate governance device?Evidence fromUS and UK[R].Working Paper,University of Georgia,2010.
[7]Yermack,David.Shareholder voting and corporate governance[J].Annual Reviewof Financial Economics,2010,2:103-125.
[8]Ferri,F,Erti mur,Y,and Stubben,S.Board of directors’responsiveness to shareholders:Evidence fromshareholder proposals[J].Journal of Corporate Finance,2010,16(1):53-72.
[9]Pinto,M.The role of institutional investor in the corporate governance[R].German Working Papers in Law and Economics,2006.
[10]Guercio,D D,Cole,L S,and Woidtke,T.Do boards pay attention wheninstitutional investor activists‘just vote no’?[J].Journal of Financial Economics,2008,90(1):84-103.
[11]Bebchuk,Lucian A,and Grinstein,Yaniv.The growth of executive pay[J].Oxford Reviewof Economic Policy,2005,21(2):283-303.
[12]Martin,K J,and Thomas,R S.Litigating challenges to executive pay:An exercise in futility?[J].Washington UniversityLaw Quarterly,2001,79:569-613.
[13]Carleton,et al.The influence of institutions on corporate governance through private negotiations:Evidence from TI AA-CREF[J].Journal of Finance,1998,53(4):1 335-1 362.
[14]Ferri,Fabrizio,and Maber,David.Say on pay vote and CEOcompensation:Evidence fromthe UK[R].Working Paper,NewYork University,2010.
[15]Thomas,R S,and Martin,KJ.The effect of shareholder proposals on executive compensation[J].University of CincinnatiLaw Review,1999,67(4):1 021-1 081.
[16]Burns,Natasha,and Minnick,Kristina.Does say on pay matter?Evidence in the U.S[.R].Working Paper,2010.
[17]Alissa,Walid.Boards’response to shareholders’dissatisfaction:The case of shareholders’say on payin the UK[R].WorkingPaper,Pennsylvania State University,2009.
[18]Martin,Kenneth J,and Thomas,RS.The determinants of shareholder voting on stock option plans[J].Wake Forest Law Re-view,2000,35:31-81.
[19]Cai,J,Garner,J L,and Walkling,R A.Electing directors[J].Journal of Finance,2009,64(5):2 389-2 421.
[20]Erti mur,Y,Ferri,F,and Maber,D.Reputation penalties for poor monitoring of executive pay:Evidence fromoption backdat-ing[R].Working Paper,University of Texas,2010.
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黄再胜. 国外经理薪酬治理研究进展与评析——基于股东能动主义视角[J]. 外国经济与管理, 2011, 33(4): 51–58.
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