This paper examines how intra-firm decision rights allocation affects the strategic disclosure of management earnings forecasts. The study shows that, in firms with centralized decision rights, top managers can obtain more private benefits of control while bearing greater responsibility for corporate performance. As a result, they are inclined to reduce the disclosure of earnings forecasts that convey negative news. Utilizing the abnormal concentration of cash flows in parent companies as a proxy for decision rights centralization in Chinese business groups, this paper uncover a negative correlation between this measure and the proportion of negative earnings forecasts disclosed by the management. Mechanism testing reveals that centralized decision rights is positively associated with over-investment, insider trading, and management pay-performance sensitivity, suggesting the presence of two primary mechanisms: the private benefit enhancement effect and the performance accountability concentration effect. Heterogeneity analysis shows that the negative relationship between centralization and the proportion of negative forecasts is more pronounced in firms with more subsidiaries and less shareholding by major shareholders. Further analysis reveals that decision rights allocation mainly affects firms’ inclination to disclose negative forecasts rather than the quantity of disclosures. For negative forecasts, centralization leads to reduced disclosure precision and a stronger tendency toward external attribution. This paper enriches the literature on the economic consequences of decision rights allocation, offering insights for optimizing decision rights allocation and enhancing information efficiency.