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4169证券交易所对上市公司发放问询函是近年来加强一线监管的重要体现，但对这种非处罚性监管的经济后果研究比较缺乏。文章基于交易所财务报告问询函，研究了非处罚性监管对企业风险承担的影响。研究表明，收到财务报告问询函后，企业风险承担水平显著提高，且收到的财务报告问询函总数越多、针对同一财务报告的问询次数越多、财务报告问询函问题数量越多、回函公告总数越多，提高企业风险承担水平的作用越强，同时财务报告问询函的细分特征也会影响其对企业风险承担的促进作用。进一步研究发现，国有产权和政治关联不利于问询函监管发挥作用，问询函监管通过缓解股东和管理层之间的代理问题，提高了企业风险承担水平和投资效率。文章的研究验证了非处罚性监管的有效性，体现了十九大报告强调的“创新监管方式改革”，也为“经济高质量发展目标”提供了来自资本市场的证据。
非处罚性监管与企业风险承担——基于财务报告问询函的证据
摘要
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引用本文
邓祎璐, 陆晨, 兰天琪, 等. 非处罚性监管与企业风险承担——基于财务报告问询函的证据[J]. 财经研究, 2021, 47(8): 123-138.
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