金融危机、政府担保与储户挤兑——来自中国“白银风潮”的历史证据
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财经研究 2015 年 第 41 卷第 08 期, 页码：
摘要
参考文献
摘要
政府担保在金融危机期间如何影响储户的挤兑行为，对该问题的回答有助于我们从储户行为的视角认识政府担保在维护金融稳定中的作用。1935年的“白银风潮”作为中国近代史上的一次金融危机，为研究上述问题提供了绝佳的自然实验。文章利用总行设在上海的银行1932-1935年的资产负债表数据，实证检验了“白银风潮”期间政府担保对储户行为的影响。结果表明：政府担保显著降低了银行遭遇储户挤兑的概率，并且促使银行吸引更多存款流入；储户从不受政府担保的银行提取存款转而存入受到政府担保的银行，由此引起的存款再分配效应避免了整个银行体系的崩溃。文章还发现，具有政府担保的银行在危机期间投放了更多信贷，这对经济的复苏起到了推动作用。文章对于我国的金融安全网从隐性政府担保向显性存款保险制度的转型具有启示。
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[35]Keeley M C. Deposit insurance, risk, and market power in banking[J].American Economic Review, 1990,80(5):1183-1200.
[36]Opiela T P. Was there an implicit full guarantee at financial institutions in Thailand? Evidence of risk pricing by depositors[J].Journal of Comparative Economics,2004,32(3):519-541.
[37]Schnabel I. The role of liquidity and implicit guarantees in the German twin crisis of 1931[J].Journal of International Money and Finance,2009,28（1）:1-25.
[38]Schumacher L. Bank runs and currency run in a system without a safety net: Argentina and the ‘tequila’ shock[J].Journal of Monetary Economics,2000,46(1): 257-277.
[39]Sironi A. Testing for market discipline in the European banking industry: Evidence from subordinated debt issues[J].Journal of Money, Credit and Banking,2003,35（3）:443-472.
[2]管汉晖. 20世纪30年代大萧条中的中国宏观经济［J］.经济研究，2007，（2）：16-26.
[3]洪葭管.中国金融史［M］.成都：西南财经大学出版社，1993.
[4]洪葭管.中国金融通史（第4卷）［M］.北京：中国金融出版社，2008.
[5]侯桂芳.上海银钱界与1935年白银风潮［J］.上海师范大学学报（哲学社会科学版），2002，（3）：47-55.
[6]黄如桐.一九三五年国民党政府法币政策概述及其评价［J］.近代史研究，1985，（6）：94-116.
[7]李宇平.一九三〇年代中国经济恐慌的若干现象中［J］.台湾师范大学历史学报，1997，（25）：71-118.
[8]刘冲，盘宇章.银行间市场与金融稳定——理论与证据［J］.金融研究，2013，（12）：72-86.
[9]刘愿，岳翔宇.看不见的手如何治理货币？——声誉机制的作用及来自中国白银风潮中银行微观数据的证据［R］.工作论文，2014.
[10]孙建华.近代中国金融发展与制度变迁：1840-1945［M］.北京：中国财政经济出版社 ，2008.
[11]吴晶晶.一二八事变后上海银行业之联合准备制［J］.史林，2005，（3）：73-79.
[12]余捷琼.中国的新货币政策［M］.上海：商务印书馆，1937.
[13]郑会欣.试论1935年白银风潮的原因及其后果［J］.历史档案，1984，（2）：113-119.
[14]郑亦芳.上海钱庄（1843—1937）:中国传统金融业的蜕变［J］.台湾中央研究院三民主义研究所丛刊，1981，（7）：148-215.
[15]中国银行总管理处经济研究室.中华民国二十三年全国银行年鉴［M］.上海：汉文正楷印书局，1934.
[16]中国银行总管理处经济研究室.中华民国二十四年全国银行年鉴［M］.上海：汉文正楷印书局，1935.
[17]中国银行总管理处经济研究室.中华民国二十五年全国银行年鉴［M］.上海：汉文正楷印书局，1936.
[18]中国银行总管理处经济研究室.中华民国二十六年全国银行年鉴［M］.上海：汉文正楷印书局，1937.
[19]Acharya V V, Gale D, Yorulmarez T. Rollover Risk and Market Freezes[J].Journal of Finance, 2012, 66(4): 1177-1209.
[20]Acharya V V, Anginer D, Warburton A J. The end of market discipline? Investor expectations of implicit government guarantees[R].Working Paper,2013.
[21]Acharya V V, Kulkarni N. Government guarantees and bank vulnerability during the Financial Crisis of 2007-09: Evidence from an emerging market[R]. Working Paper, 2014.
[22]Beyhaghi M, D’Souza C, Roberts G S. Funding advantage and market discipline in the Canadian banking sector[J]. Journal of Banking and Finance, 2014,48: 396-410.
[23]Brandt L, Sargent T. Interpreting new evidence about China and U.S. silver purchases[J].Journal of Monetary Economics, 1989,23(1): 31-52.
[24]Brean D J S, Kryzanowski L, Roberts G S. Canada and the United States:Different roots, different routes to financial sector regulation[J].Business History, 2011,53 (2): 249-269.
[25]Burdekin R C K . US pressure on China: Silver flows, deflation, and the 1934 Shanghai credit crunch[J].China Economic Review, 2008,19(2): 170-182.
[26]Diamond D, Dybvig P. Bank runs, deposit insurance, and liquidity[J].Journal of Political Economy,1983，91(3):401-419.
[27]Diamond D W. Financial intermediation and delegated monitoring[J].The Review of Economic Studies, 1984,51(3): 393-414.
[28]Flannery M J. Using market information in prudential bank supervision: A review of the U.S. empirical evidence[J].Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 1998 30（3）:273-305.
[29]Friedman M, Schwartz A J.A monetary history of the United States，1867-1960.[M].Princeton :Princeton University Press，1971.
[30]Friedman M,Franklin D. Roosevelt, silver, and China[J].Journal of Political Economy,1992,100(2): 62-83.
[31]Gropp R, Vesala J, Vulpes G. Equity and bond market signals as leading indicators of bank fragility [J].Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 2006,38（2）: 399-428.
[32]Gropp R, Gruendl C, Guettler A. The impact of public guarantees on bank risktaking: Evidence from a natural experiment[J].Review of Finance,2014,18(2):457-488.
[33]Iyer R，Puri M. Understanding bank runs: The importance of depositorbank relationships and networks[J]. American Economic Review, 2012,102(4): 1414-1445.
[34]Karas A, Pyle W, Schoors K. Deposit insurance, banking crises, and market discipline: Evidence from a natural experiment on deposit flows and rates[J] Journal of Money, Credit and Banking,2013,45(1):179-200.
[35]Keeley M C. Deposit insurance, risk, and market power in banking[J].American Economic Review, 1990,80(5):1183-1200.
[36]Opiela T P. Was there an implicit full guarantee at financial institutions in Thailand? Evidence of risk pricing by depositors[J].Journal of Comparative Economics,2004,32(3):519-541.
[37]Schnabel I. The role of liquidity and implicit guarantees in the German twin crisis of 1931[J].Journal of International Money and Finance,2009,28（1）:1-25.
[38]Schumacher L. Bank runs and currency run in a system without a safety net: Argentina and the ‘tequila’ shock[J].Journal of Monetary Economics,2000,46(1): 257-277.
[39]Sironi A. Testing for market discipline in the European banking industry: Evidence from subordinated debt issues[J].Journal of Money, Credit and Banking,2003,35（3）:443-472.
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刘 冲, 周瑾芝. 金融危机、政府担保与储户挤兑——来自中国“白银风潮”的历史证据[J]. 财经研究, 2015, 41(8): 0.
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