信号显示博弈与国际寡头最优进入策略的选择
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财经研究 2005 年 第 31 卷第 10 期, 页码：7 - 15
摘要
参考文献
摘要
在信息不完全的国际市场竞争中,寡头企业可以通过观察竞争者不同市场进入策略带来的收益为信号帮助判断其真实的成本类型。文章以FDI和出口贸易作为信号推证了在成本类型不确定条件下混同均衡和分离均衡存在的条件;文章的推论表明如果分离均衡条件满足,双边企业可以获得完全信息条件下的均衡产出,如果混同均衡条件满足,双方则将按照不完全信息博弈规则选择古诺纳什产出。
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[3]Qiu L D.Optimal strategic trade policy under asymmetric information[J].Journal ofInternational Economics,1994,36:333~354.
[4]Donald J Wright.Strategy trade policy and signaling with unobservable costs[J].Reviewof International Economics,1998,6(1):105~119.
[5]Collie David,Hviid Morten.Export subsidies as signals of competitiveness[J].Scandi-navian Journal of Economics,1993,95(3):327~340.
[6]Collie David R,Hviid Morten.Tariffs as signals of uncompetitiveness[J].Review of In-ternational Economics,1999,7(4):571~580.
[7]Massimo Motta.Does economic integration cause foreign direct investment[J].Interna-tional Economic Review,1996,37(4):757~783.
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[9]Head Keith,Ries John.Overseas:Investment and firm exports[J].Review of Interna-tional Economics,2001,9(1):108~123.
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[13]Kemp,Murray c,Ohyama,Michihiro.The gain from free trade under conditions ofuncertainty[J].Journal of International Economics,1978,8(1):139~141.
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姚洪心, 刘存绪. 信号显示博弈与国际寡头最优进入策略的选择[J]. 财经研究, 2005, 31(10): 7–15.
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