高科技企业R&D支出资本化的动机研究
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财经研究 2011 年 第 37 卷第 04 期, 页码：104 - 112
摘要
参考文献
摘要
文章以2007-2009年在深圳交易所上市的高科技企业为样本,实证研究了R&D支出资本化动机的影响因素。研究结果表明,高科技企业R&D支出资本化的比例受到债务契约和资本市场动机的影响,企业的财务杠杆越高,越倾向于把R&D支出进行资本化处理;在经营状况不好时,企业为保持上市资格、扭亏为盈而趋于把R&D支出进行资本化处理。薪酬契约和收益平滑尚不能很好地解释R&D支出资本化的选择动机。
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[4]蒲文燕.研发费用、企业管理当局与盈余管理[J].财会通讯(学术版),2008,(7):43-45.
[5]王建新.长期资产减值转回研究——来自中国证券市场的经验证据[J].管理世界,2007,(3):42-50.
[6]许罡,朱卫东.管理当局、研发支出资本化选择与盈余管理动机——基于新无形资产准则研究阶段划分的实证研究[J].科学学与科学技术管理,2010,(9):39-43.
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[8]Anne Cazavan-Jeny,Thomas Jeanjean,Peter Joos.Accounting choice and future per-formance:The case of R&D accounting in France[J].Journal of Accounting and PublicPolicy,2010,(9):1-21.
[9]Burgstahler D,DichevI.Earnings management to avoid earnings decreases andlosses[J].Jour-nal of Accounting and Economics,1997,24:99-126.
[10]Daley L,R Vigeland.The effects of debt covenants and political costs onthe choice ofaccounting methods:The case of accounting for R&D costs[J].Journal of Accountingand Economics,1983,(5):195-211.
[11]DeFond ML,Jiambalvo J.Debt covenant violation and manipulation of accruals[J].Journal of Accounting and Economics,1994,17:145-176.
[12]Healy P,Wahlen J.Areview of the earnings management literature and its i mplica-tions for standard setting[J].Accounting Horizons,1999,13:365-383.
[13]Healy P.The effect of bonus schemes on accounting decisions[J].Journal of Account-ing and Economics,1985,(7):85-107.
[14]Garen Markarian,Lorenzo Pozza,Annalisa Prencipe.Capitalization of R&D costsand earnings management:Evidence fromItalianlisted companies[J].International Jour-nal of Accounting,2008,43:246-267.
[15]Sweeney A P.Debt-covenant violations and managers’accounting responses[J].Jour-nal of Accounting and Economics,1994,17:281-308.
引用本文
王艳, 冯延超, 梁莱歆. 高科技企业R&D支出资本化的动机研究[J]. 财经研究, 2011, 37(4): 104–112.
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