现金、股利资产估值与独立董事有效性——基于价值回归模型的实证研究
5747 
3093
财经研究 2011 年 第 37 卷第 03 期, 页码：28 - 39
摘要
参考文献
摘要
文章在借鉴Fama和French(1998)公司价值回归模型的基础上,从公司内部现金和股利价值的角度,研究了中国上市公司独立董事的有效性。研究表明:将独立董事引入公司董事会能够显著提升公司内部所持现金的价值,明显降低了股利对公司价值的贡献。这一证据表明,独立董事有效地抑制了公司管理层和大股东牺牲投资者利益、谋取私人利益的行为,提高了公司治理水平。文章还发现,独立董事在一定程度上抵消了公司董事会规模与公司价值的负相关关系,这在一定程度上解释了董事会规模与公司价值之间可能存在的非线性关系。
[1]夏立军,方轶强.政府控制、治理环境与公司价值——来自中国证券市场的经验证据[J].经济研究,2005,(5):40-51.
[2]魏刚,肖泽忠,Travlos Nick,等.独立董事背景与公司经营绩效[J].经济研究,2007,(3):92-105.
[3]吴淑琨,刘忠明,范建强.非执行董事与公司绩效的实证研究[J].中国工业经济,2001,(9):69-76.
[4]杨兴全,张照南.制度背景、股权性质与公司持有现金价值[J].经济研究,2008,(12):111-123.
[5]叶康涛,陆正飞,张志华.独立董事能否抑制大股东的“掏空”?[J].经济研究,2007,(4):101-111.
[6]赵昌文,唐英凯,周静,等.家族企业独立董事与企业价值——对中国上市公司独立董事制度合理性的检验[J].管理世界,2008,(8):119-125.
[7]朱茶芬.发送信号还是讨好政府:关于独立董事聘请动机的经验研究[J].世界经济,2006,(12):81-89.
[8]Agrawal A,Chadha S.Corporate governance and accounting scandals[J].Journal ofLaw and Economics,2005,48(2):371-406.
[9]Andres P,Vallelado E.Corporate governance in banking:The role of the board of di-rectors[J].Journal of Banking and Finance,2008,32(12):2570-2580.
[10]Dahya J,Dimitrov O,McConnell J J.Dominant shareholders,corporate boards,andcorporate value:A cross-country analysis[J].Journal of Financial Economics,2008,87(1):73-100.
[11]Dittmar A,Mahrt-Smith J.Corporate governance and the value of cash holdings[J].Journal of Financial Economics,2007,83(3):599-634.
[12]Duchin R,Matsusaka J G,Ozbas O.When are outside directors effective?[J].Journalof Financial Economics,2010,96(2):195-214.
[13]Durnev A,Kim E H.To steal or not to steal:Firm attributes,legal environment,andvaluation[J].Journal of Finance,2005,60(3):1461-1493.
[14]Fama E F,French K R.Taxes,financing decisions,and firm value[J].Journal of Fi-nance,1998,53(3):819-843.
[15]Fama E F,Jensen M C.Separation of ownership and control[J].Journal of Law andEconomics,1983,26(2):301-325.
[16]Jensen M C.Agency costs of free cash flow,corporate finance,and takeovers[J].American Economic Review,1986,76(2):323-329.
[17]Jensen M C.The modern industrial revolution,exit,and the failure of internal controlsystems[J].Journal of Finance,1993,48(3):831-880.
[18]Jensen M C,Meckling W H.Theory of the firm:Managerial behavior,agency costsand ownership structure[J].Journal of Financial Economics,1976,3(4):305-360.
[19]La Porta R,Lopez-De-Silanes F,Shleifer A,et al.Investor protection and corpo-rate valuation[J].Journal of Finance,2002,57(3):1147-1170.
[20]Lang L H P,Litzenberger R H.Dividend announcements:Cash flow signalling vs.freecash flow hypothesis?[J].Journal of Financial Economics,1989,24(1):181-191.
[21]Myers S C,Rajan R G.The paradox of liquidity[J].Quarterly Journal of Economics,1998,113(3):733-771.
[22]Omran M.Post-privatization corporate governance and firm performance:The role ofprivate ownership concentration,identity and board composition[J].Journal of Compar-ative Economics,2009,37(4):658-673.
[23]Pinkowitz L,Stulz R,Williamson R.Does the contribution of corporate cash holdingsand dividends to firm value depend on governance?A cross-country analysis[J].Jour-nal of Finance,2006,61(6):2725-2751.
[2]魏刚,肖泽忠,Travlos Nick,等.独立董事背景与公司经营绩效[J].经济研究,2007,(3):92-105.
[3]吴淑琨,刘忠明,范建强.非执行董事与公司绩效的实证研究[J].中国工业经济,2001,(9):69-76.
[4]杨兴全,张照南.制度背景、股权性质与公司持有现金价值[J].经济研究,2008,(12):111-123.
[5]叶康涛,陆正飞,张志华.独立董事能否抑制大股东的“掏空”?[J].经济研究,2007,(4):101-111.
[6]赵昌文,唐英凯,周静,等.家族企业独立董事与企业价值——对中国上市公司独立董事制度合理性的检验[J].管理世界,2008,(8):119-125.
[7]朱茶芬.发送信号还是讨好政府:关于独立董事聘请动机的经验研究[J].世界经济,2006,(12):81-89.
[8]Agrawal A,Chadha S.Corporate governance and accounting scandals[J].Journal ofLaw and Economics,2005,48(2):371-406.
[9]Andres P,Vallelado E.Corporate governance in banking:The role of the board of di-rectors[J].Journal of Banking and Finance,2008,32(12):2570-2580.
[10]Dahya J,Dimitrov O,McConnell J J.Dominant shareholders,corporate boards,andcorporate value:A cross-country analysis[J].Journal of Financial Economics,2008,87(1):73-100.
[11]Dittmar A,Mahrt-Smith J.Corporate governance and the value of cash holdings[J].Journal of Financial Economics,2007,83(3):599-634.
[12]Duchin R,Matsusaka J G,Ozbas O.When are outside directors effective?[J].Journalof Financial Economics,2010,96(2):195-214.
[13]Durnev A,Kim E H.To steal or not to steal:Firm attributes,legal environment,andvaluation[J].Journal of Finance,2005,60(3):1461-1493.
[14]Fama E F,French K R.Taxes,financing decisions,and firm value[J].Journal of Fi-nance,1998,53(3):819-843.
[15]Fama E F,Jensen M C.Separation of ownership and control[J].Journal of Law andEconomics,1983,26(2):301-325.
[16]Jensen M C.Agency costs of free cash flow,corporate finance,and takeovers[J].American Economic Review,1986,76(2):323-329.
[17]Jensen M C.The modern industrial revolution,exit,and the failure of internal controlsystems[J].Journal of Finance,1993,48(3):831-880.
[18]Jensen M C,Meckling W H.Theory of the firm:Managerial behavior,agency costsand ownership structure[J].Journal of Financial Economics,1976,3(4):305-360.
[19]La Porta R,Lopez-De-Silanes F,Shleifer A,et al.Investor protection and corpo-rate valuation[J].Journal of Finance,2002,57(3):1147-1170.
[20]Lang L H P,Litzenberger R H.Dividend announcements:Cash flow signalling vs.freecash flow hypothesis?[J].Journal of Financial Economics,1989,24(1):181-191.
[21]Myers S C,Rajan R G.The paradox of liquidity[J].Quarterly Journal of Economics,1998,113(3):733-771.
[22]Omran M.Post-privatization corporate governance and firm performance:The role ofprivate ownership concentration,identity and board composition[J].Journal of Compar-ative Economics,2009,37(4):658-673.
[23]Pinkowitz L,Stulz R,Williamson R.Does the contribution of corporate cash holdingsand dividends to firm value depend on governance?A cross-country analysis[J].Jour-nal of Finance,2006,61(6):2725-2751.
引用本文
徐晓萍, 李进军. 现金、股利资产估值与独立董事有效性——基于价值回归模型的实证研究[J]. 财经研究, 2011, 37(3): 28–39.
导出参考文献，格式为：
