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3745文章从关系型合约的视角研究了公司选择双重股权结构的内在动因。在我国，企业的商业模式普遍具有关系型交易特征。与市场型交易不同，关系型交易依靠交易各方由关系专有性投资所建立起的信任关系来自我履约。文章分析认为，双重股权结构带来的多倍投票权与稳定控制权可以降低关系型合约的执行成本，保障关系型合约的长期稳定执行。文章以1997—2018年339家在美上市的中国公司
关系型合约视角下双重股权结构选择动因解析——来自中概股的经验证据
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引用本文
蓝紫文, 李增泉. 关系型合约视角下双重股权结构选择动因解析——来自中概股的经验证据[J]. 财经研究, 2022, 48(3): 139-153.
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