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4817党组织参与公司治理，是我国公司治理结构中的一个重要特征。文章利用我国A股非金融类上市公司2009−2016年的数据，考察了党组织通过“双向进入、交叉任职”参与治理对公司避税行为的影响。研究发现，“双向进入”对税收激进度几乎没有显著影响，而“交叉任职”公司的税收激进度显著更低。进一步研究发现，“交叉任职”对避税活动的抑制作用主要存在于税收激进度较高、相关风险较高的情况下，而“交叉任职”在税收激进度较低的情况下并不会显著抑制企业正常的避税行为；在国有企业和非国有企业中，“交叉任职”对税收激进度的影响在统计上并没有显著差异；“全面从严治党”前后，“交叉任职”的作用也没有显著差异。文章从企业避税行为的角度提供了党组织参与治理经济后果的经验证据。
党组织参与治理对上市公司避税行为的影响
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引用本文
李明辉, 刘笑霞, 程海艳. 党组织参与治理对上市公司避税行为的影响[J]. 财经研究, 2020, 46(3): 49-64.
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