控股股东委派董事能降低公司盈余管理吗?
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上海财经大学学报 2014 年 第 16 卷第 04 期, 页码：74 - 85
摘要
参考文献
摘要
虽然已有研究表明控股股东对公司会计信息质量具有重要影响,但很少深入分析控股股东在获取共享收益时如何影响公司会计信息质量,也没有考察控股股东实施影响的特定渠道。文章考察控股股东委派董事这一特定渠道在实现控股股东共享收益目标时,对于公司盈余管理行为的监督是否表现出非对称性。文章使用中国资本市场上市公司2004-2011年的数据进行检验,研究结果表明当公司高管向上操纵盈余时,控股股东委派董事发挥了有效的监督作用,显著降低了高管的盈余管理行为;但当公司高管向下操纵盈余时,控股股东委派董事并没有发挥监督作用。使用工具变量控制内生性问题与分组测试的结果表明结果具有稳健性。进一步测试控股股东委派董事与高管薪酬业绩敏感性之间的关系,结果表明当公司高管向上操纵盈余时,控股股东委派董事并没有加强高管薪酬业绩敏感性;只有当公司高管向下操纵盈余时,控股股东委派董事才会加强高管薪酬业绩敏感性。文章结论对于理解公司董事会构成和治理功能的发挥具有现实意义。
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[4]宁向东,张颖.独立董事能够勤勉和诚信地进行监督吗——独立董事行为决策模型的构建[J].中国工业经济,2012,(1).
[5]Becker B.,Cronqvist H.,Fahlenbrach R.Estimating The Effects of Large Shareholders Using a Geographic Instrument[J].Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis,2011,46:907-942.
[6]Chen S.,Ma H.,Bu D.Board Affiliation and Pay Gap[J].China Journal of Accounting Research,2014,7:81-100.
[7]Claessens S.,Yurtoglu B.B.Corporate Governance in Emerging Markets:A Survey[J].Emerging Markets Review,2013,15:1-33.
[8]Cronqvist H.,Fahlenbrach R.Large Shareholders and Corporate Policies[J].Review of Financial Studies,2009,22:3941-3976.
[9]Erkens D.H.,Subramanyam K.R.,Zhang J.Affiliated Banker on Board and Conservative Accounting[J].Working Paper,2013.
[10]Gopalan R.,Jayaraman S.Private Control Benefits and Earnings Management:Evidence from Insider Controlled Firms[J].Journal of Accounting Research,2012,50(1):117-157.
[11]Jaggi B.,Leung S.,Gul F.Family Control,Board Independence,and Earnings Management:Evidence Based on Hong Kong Firms[J].Journal of Accounting and Public Policy,2009,28:281-300.
[12]Kothari S.P.,Leone A.J.,Wasley C.E.Performance Matched Discretionary Accrual Measures[J].Journal of Accounting and Economics,2005,39:163-197.
[13]La Porta R.,Lopez-de-silanes F.,Shleifer A.Corporate Ownership Around the World[J].Journal of Finance,1999,54:417-518.
[14]Larcker D.F.,Rusticus T.O.On the Use of Instrumental Variables in Accounting Research[J].Journal of Accounting and Economics,2010,49:186-205.
[15]Nelson M.,Elliot J.,Tarpley R.Evidence From Auditors about Managers’and Auditors’Earnings Management Decisions[J].The Accounting Review,2002,77:175-202.
[16]Peasnell K.V.,Pope P.F.,Young S.Board Monitoring and Earnings Management:Do Outside Directors Influence Abnormal Accruals[J].Journal of Business Finance&Accounting,2005,32(7-8):1311-1346.
[17]Shleifer A.,Vishny.R.W.Large Shareholders and Corporate Control[J].Journal of Political Economy,1986,94:461-488.
[18]Shleifer A.,Vishny R.W.A Survey of Corporate Governance[J].Journal of Finance,1997,52(2):737-783.
[19]Yeh Y.H.,Woidtke T.Commitment or Entrenchment?Controlling Shareholders and Board Composition[J].Journal of Banking and Finance,2005,29:1857-1885.
引用本文
陈胜蓝, 吕丹. 控股股东委派董事能降低公司盈余管理吗?[J]. 上海财经大学学报, 2014, 16(4): 74–85.
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