自从Jensen和Meckling(1976)指出股权激励能缓解股东和管理层之间的代理问题以来,已有很多研究为股权激励的内部治理效应提供了经验证据,但股权激励是否具有外部治理效应,却鲜有研究。基于此,文章研究股权激励能否吸引更多的市场关注,以及外部的市场关注能否激励管理层实现市场预期,从而为股权激励是否具有外部治理效应提供一定的经验证据。基于沪深两市A股上市公司数据的研究发现,与未实施股权激励的公司相比,实施股权激励的公司会吸引更多的市场关注,并且公司实际业绩与市场预期的差距更小;在没有达到市场预期的情形下,与没有实施股权激励的公司相比,实施股权激励公司达不到市场预期的程度更小;股权激励的外部治理作用主要发生在两职分离公司和民营公司,当市场关注度更高时,股权激励在提升公司业绩方面更有效。该结论为股权激励的有效性争论提供了新思路,也为监管部门完善股权激励政策提供了一定的理论基础。
股权激励、市场关注与市场预期实现
摘要
参考文献
2 罗富碧,冉茂盛,杜家廷. 高管人员股权激励与投资决策关系的实证研究[J]. 会计研究,2008,(8). DOI:10.3969/j.issn.1003-2886.2008.08.012
8 肖淑芳,石琦,王婷,等. 上市公司股权激励方式选择偏好——基于激励对象视角的研究[J]. 会计研究,2016,(6). DOI:10.3969/j.issn.1003-2886.2016.06.012
10 辛宇,吕长江. 激励、福利还是奖励:薪酬管制背景下国有企业股权激励的定位困境——基于泸州老窖的案例分析[J]. 会计研究,2012,(6). DOI:10.3969/j.issn.1003-2886.2012.06.011
13 Almazan A,Banerji S,Motta A D. Attracting attention:Cheap managerial talk and costly market monitoring[J]. Journal of Finance,2008,63(3):1399–1436. DOI:10.1111/j.1540-6261.2008.01361.x
14 Armstrong C S,Jagolinzer A D,Larcker D. F Chief executive officer equity incentives and accounting irregularities[J]. Journal of Accounting Research,2010,48(2):273–287. DOI:10.1111/j.1475-679X.2010.00367.x
15 Bebchuk L A,Fried J M. Executive compensation as an agency problem[J]. Journal of Economic Perspectives,2003,17(3):71–92. DOI:10.1257/089533003769204362
16 Bebchuk L A,Fried J M,Walker D I. Managerial power and rent extraction in the design of executive compensation[J]. University of Chicago Law Review,2002,69(3):751–846. DOI:10.2307/1600632
17 Bischof J,Daske. Mandatory disclosure,voluntary disclosure,and stock market liquidity:Evidence from the EU bank stress tests[J]. Journal of Accounting Research,2013,51(5):997–1029. DOI:10.1111/1475-679X.12029
18 Bizjak J M,Brickley J A,Coles J L. Stock-based incentive compensation and investment behavior[J]. Journal of Accounting and Economics,1993,16(1–3):349–372. DOI:10.1016/0165-4101(93)90017-A
19 Brown L D,Kim K J. Timely aggregate analyst forecasts as better proxies for market earnings expectations[J]. Journal of Accounting Research,1991,29(2):382–385. DOI:10.2307/2491055
20 Chen Z,Guan Y,Ke B. Are stock option grants to directors of state-controlled Chinese firms listed in Hong Kong genuine compensation?[J]. The Accounting Review,2013,88(5):1547–1574. DOI:10.2308/accr-50504
21 Cheng Q,Warfield T D. Equity incentives and earnings management[J]. The Accounting Review,2005,80(2):441–476. DOI:10.2308/accr.2005.80.2.441
22 Clogg C C,Petkova E,Haritou A. Statistical methods for comparing regression coefficients between models[J]. American Journal of Sociology,1995,100(5):1261–1293. DOI:10.1086/230638
23 Core J E,Holthausen R W,Larcker D F. Corporate governance,chief executive officer compensation,and firm performance[J]. Journal of Financial Economics,1999,51(3):371–406. DOI:10.1016/S0304-405X(98)00058-0
25 Fama E F,Jensen M C. Separation of ownership and control[J]. The Journal of Law and Economics,1983,26(2):301–325. DOI:10.1086/467037
26 Givoly D,Lakonishok J. The information content of financial analysts’ forecasts of earnings:Some evidence on semi-strong inefficiency[J]. Journal of Accounting and Economics,1979,1(3):165–185. DOI:10.1016/0165-4101(79)90006-5
27 Hanlon M,Rajgopal S,Shevlin T. Are executive stock options associated with future earnings?[J]. Journal of Accounting and Economics,2003,36(1–3):3–43. DOI:10.1016/j.jacceco.2003.10.008
28 Holmstrom B. Moral hazard and observability[J]. Bell Journal of Economics,1979,10(1):74–91. DOI:10.2307/3003320
29 Holmstrom B,Tirole J. Market liquidity and performance monitoring[J]. Journal of Political Economy,1993,101(4):678–709. DOI:10.1086/261893
30 Jensen M C,Meckling W H. Theory of the firm:Managerial behavior,agency costs and ownership structure[J]. Journal of Financial Economics,1976,3(4):305–360. DOI:10.1016/0304-405X(76)90026-X
31 Kato H K,Lemmon M,Luo M,et al. An empirical examination of the costs and benefits of executive stock options:Evidence from Japan[J]. Journal of Financial Economics,2005,78(2):435–461. DOI:10.1016/j.jfineco.2004.09.001
32 Kothari S P. Capital markets research in accounting[J]. Journal of Accounting and Economics,2001,31(1–3):105–231. DOI:10.1016/S0165-4101(01)00030-1
33 Lang M,Lins K V,Maffett M. Transparency,liquidity,and valuation:International evidence on when transparency matters most[J]. Journal of Accounting Research,2012,50(3):729–774. DOI:10.1111/j.1475-679X.2012.00442.x
34 Lang M H,Lins K V,Miller D P. ADRs,analysts,and accuracy:Does cross listing in the United States improve a firm’s information environment and increase market value[J]. Journal of Accounting Research,2003,41(2):317–345. DOI:10.1111/1475-679X.00106
38 Patricia C O’brien. Analysts’ forecasts as earnings expectations[J]. Journal of Accounting and Economics,1988,10(1):53–83. DOI:10.1016/0165-4101(88)90023-7
39 Rosenbaum P R,Rubin D B. The central role of the propensity score in observational studies for causal effects[J]. Biometrika,1983,70(1):41–55. DOI:10.1093/biomet/70.1.41
41 Yermack D. Do corporations award CEO stock options effectively?[J]. Journal of Financial Economics,1995,39(2–3):237–269. DOI:10.1016/0304-405X(95)00829-4
引用本文
储溢泉, 仓勇涛, 储一昀. 股权激励、市场关注与市场预期实现[J]. 上海财经大学学报, 2020, 22(2): 81-95.
导出参考文献,格式为: