3722 
4511当企业面临经营困境时，企业是否会采取极端的败德行为来应对困境是一个值得探讨的重要问题。文章基于企业行为理论和高层梯队理论，采用2003-2016年我国A股上市企业数据，探讨了经营期望落差对企业财务造假的影响，并进一步分析了管理者自主权对上述关系的调节机制。结果显示：随着经营期望落差的增加，企业倾向于采取更大程度的财务造假行为来应对经营压力；当董事长-CEO二职兼任时，CEO拥有更高的管理自主权而强化了经营期望落差与财务造假程度之间的正向关系；CEO和CFO的任期交错程度越大，CEO的管理自主权越低，经营期望落差与财务造假程度之间的正向关系也越弱；企业的股权集中度越高，股东对CEO参与战略决策的监管程度越强，越能够抑制经营期望落差与财务造假程度之间的正向关系。这一研究成果对规范公司合法经营、完善公司治理结构以及强化内部控制机制具有现实意义和启示作用。
经营期望落差、管理自主权与企业财务造假
摘要
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引用本文
连燕玲, 刘依琳, 郑伟伟. 经营期望落差、管理自主权与企业财务造假[J]. 上海财经大学学报, 2021, 23(2): 46-60.
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