3689 
5306为了使中央政府的税收政策更为有效，需要捋清地方间税收竞争的动机和运行机制，以及央地间征管权纵向竞争在地方间策略性互动中的作用。文章基于政治激励视角研究发现，我国地方间存在一定的标杆竞争行为，地税局征管的企业所得税、个人所得税都表现出显著的“竞低”效应，营业税表现为显著的“竞高”效应，与不动产相关的税种不存在显著的税收竞争行为；中央垂直管理的国税局征管的企业所得税表现出“竞高”效应，信息化管理水平较高的增值税则不存在税收竞争行为。这表明中央征管权的集中会抑制地方间争夺流动性经济资源的“竞低”行为，但征管权向中央集中会增加国税局税收收入的“竞低”效应，这可能是由于本地国税局官员参与地方政府的“政企合谋”所致。
“竞高”还是“竞低”：基于我国省级政府税收竞争的实证检验
摘要
参考文献
7 范子英. 国地税合并将对地方经济和政府行为产生深远影响[N]. 中国经济时报, 2018-05-31（05）.
15 刘金东. 中国税收超GDP增长的因素研究[M]. 北京: 中国税务出版社, 2014.
18 马恩涛,吕函枰,陈媛媛. 横向和纵向税收外部性研究:一个综述[J]. 经济学(季刊),2018,(1).
28 张军. 中国经济发展:为增长而竞争[J]. 世界经济文汇,2005,(4). DOI:10.3969/j.issn.0488-6364.2005.04.029
29 张军,高远,傅勇,等. 中国为什么拥有了良好的基础设施?[J]. 经济研究,2007,(3).
34 Arellano M,Bond S. Some tests of specification for panel data:Monte carlo evidence and an application to employment equations[J]. The Review of Economic Studies,1991,58(2):277–297. DOI:10.2307/2297968
36 Bordignon M,Cerniglia F,Revelli F. In search of yardstick competition:A spatial analysis of Italian municipality property tax setting[J]. Journal of Urban Economics,2003,54(2):199–217. DOI:10.1016/S0094-1190(03)00062-7
37 Brueckner J K,Saavedra L A. Do local governments engage in strategic property—Tax competition?[J]. National Tax Journal,2001,54(2):203–229. DOI:10.17310/ntj.2001.2.02
38 Fischel W A. Fiscal and environmental considerations in the location of firms in suburban communities[A]. National Tax Association. Proceedings of the annual conference on taxation held under the auspices of the national tax association-tax institute of America[M]. Chicago: National Tax Association, 1974.
39 Fredriksson P G,Millimet D L. Strategic interaction and the determination of environmental policy across U.S. States[J]. Journal of Urban Economics,2002,51(1):101–122. DOI:10.1006/juec.2001.2239
40 Hoyt W H. Competitive jurisdictions,congestion,and the henry George theorem:When should property be taxed instead of land?[J]. Regional Science and Urban Economics,1991,21(3):351–370. DOI:10.1016/0166-0462(91)90063-S
41 Keen M J,Kotsogiannis C. Does federalism lead to excessively high taxes?[J]. American Economic Review,2002,92(1):363–370. DOI:10.1257/000282802760015784
42 Revelli F. Spatial patterns in local taxation:Tax mimicking or error mimicking?[J]. Applied Economics,2001,33(9):1101–1107. DOI:10.1080/00036840010007164
43 Richard J F. Tulkens H, Verdonck M. Tax interaction dynamics among Belgian municipalities 1984-1997[A]. Chander P, Drèze J, Lovell C K, et al. Public goods, environmental externalities and fiscal competition[M]. Boston, MA: Springer, 2006.
44 Rork J C. Coveting Thy neighbors’ taxation[J]. National Tax Journal,2003,56(4):775–787. DOI:10.17310/ntj.2003.4.04
45 Tiebout C M. A pure theory of local expenditures[J]. Journal of Political Economy,1956,64(5):416–424. DOI:10.1086/257839
47 White M J. Firm location in a Zoned Metropolitan Area [A]. Mills E W. Oates fiscal zoning and land use controls [M]. Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1975.
48 Wildasin D E. Interjurisdictional capital mobility:Fiscal externality and a corrective subsidy[J]. Journal of Urban Economics,1989,25(2):193–212. DOI:10.1016/0094-1190(89)90034-X
49 Wilson J D. Capital mobility and environmental standards: Is there a theoretical basis for a race to the bottom? [A]. Bhagwati J, Hudec R E. Fair trade and harmonization: Prerequisites for free trade? [M]. Cambridge: MIT Press, 1996.
50 Zodrow G R,Mieszkowski P. Pigou,Tiebout,property taxation,and the underprovision of local public goods[J]. Journal of Urban Economics,1986,19(3):356–370. DOI:10.1016/0094-1190(86)90048-3
引用本文
高凤勤, 徐震寰. “竞高”还是“竞低”：基于我国省级政府税收竞争的实证检验[J]. 上海财经大学学报, 2020, 22(1): 3-17.
导出参考文献，格式为：
