董事高管责任保险需求动因及效应研究述评与展望
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外国经济与管理 2014 年 第 36 卷第 03 期, 页码：10 - 19
摘要
参考文献
摘要
董事高管(以下简称D&O)责任保险的需求动因和效应是近年来国外公司治理研究的一个热点问题。本文在系统梳理国外学术界相关研究文献的基础上,首先归纳和介绍了现有相关研究的主要理论动因——管理者风险厌恶假说、外部监督者假说、股东利益保护假说和财务效应假说,然后从信号传递和道德风险两个方面阐述了D&O责任保险对公司治理可能产生的影响,最后在评析已有研究成果的基础上对未来研究进行了展望。
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[12]Core J.The directors’and officers’insurance premium:An outside assessment of the quality of corporate Governance[J].Journal of Law,Economics and Organization,2000,16(2):449-477.
[13]DeMarzo P and Duffie D.Corporate financial hedging with proprietary information[J].Journal of Economic Theory,1991,53(2):261-286.
[14]Fama E and Jensen M.Separation of ownership and control[J].Journal of Law and Economics,1983,26(2):301-325.
[15]George D K.The demand for directors’and officers’liability insurance by US public companies[R].Working paper,Southern Methodist University,2004.Available at:SSRN 565183,2004-papers.ssrn.com.
[16]Gillan S and Panasian C.Reassessing what matters in corporate governance:Evidence from the market for directors’and officers’liability insurance[R].Working paper,Texas Tech University,2010a.
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[18]Grossman S J and Hart O D.One share-one vote and the market for corporate control[J].Journal of Financial Economics January,1988,20(1/2):175-202.
[19]Gupta M and Prakash P.Information embedded in directors and officers insurance purchases[J].The Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance-Issues and Practice,2012,37(3):429-451.
[20]Gutiérrez M.A contractual approach to the regulation of corporate directors’fiduciary duties[R].CEMFI Working Paper,No.0013,2000.Available at:SSRN 257593,2000-papers.ssrn.com.
[21]Gutiérrez M.An economic analysis of corporate directors’fiduciary duties[J].Rand Journal of Economics,2003,34(3):516-535.
[22]Holderness C.Liability insurers as corporate monitors[J].International Review of Law and Economics,1990,10(2):115-129.
[23]Jensen M and William M.Theory of the firm:Managerial behavior agency costs and ownership structure[J].Journal of Financial Economics,1976,3(4):305-360.
[24]Lin C,et al.Directors’and officers’liability insurance and acquisition outcomes[J].Journal of Financial Economics,2011,102(3):507-525.
[25]MacMinn R.Insurance and corporate risk management[J].The Journal of Risk and Insurance,1987,54(4):658-677.
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[27]Main B G.The firm’s insurance decision:Some questions raised by the capital asset pricing model[J].Managerial and Decision Economics,1982,3(1):7-15.
[28]Main B G.Corporate insurance purchase and taxes[J].The Journal of Risk and Insurance,1983,20(2):197-223.
[29]Mayers D and Smith C.On the corporate demand for insurance[J].Journal of Business,1982,55(2):281-296.
[30]Mayers D and Clifford S.Corporate insurance and the underinvestment problem[J].The Journal of Risk and Insurance,1987,24(1):45-54.
[31]Modigliani F and Miller M H.The cost of capital,corporation finance and the theory of investment[J].The American Economic Review,1958,48(3):261-297.
[32]O’Sullivan N.Insuring the agents:The role of directors’and officers’insurance in corporate governance[J].Journal of Risk and Insurance,1997,64(3):545-556.
[33]Rees R,et al.Corporate governance and managerial incentives:Evidence from the market for D&O insurance[R].Working paper,ETH Zurich,2011.
[34]Richard D M,et al.Directors and officers insurance and corporate governance[J].Journal of Insurance Issues,2012,35(2):59-179.
[35]Romano R.Corporate governance in the aftermath of the insurance crisis[A].In Schuck P H(ed.).Tort law and the public interest:Competition,innovation,and consumer welfare[C].New York.1991a.
[36]Romano and Roberta.The shareholder suit:Litigation without foundation?[J].Journal of Law,Economics,&Organization,1991,7(1):55-87.
[37]Rothschild,M.and Stiglitz J.Equilibrium in competitive insurance markets:An essay on the economics of imperfect information[J].Quarterly Journal of Economics,1976,90(4):629-649.
[38]Schleifer A and Vishny R.Large shareholders and corporate control[J].Journal of Political Economy,1986,94(3):461-488.
[39]Skogh G.The transactions cost theory of insurance:Contracting impediments and costs[J].Journal of Risk and Insurance,1989,56(4):726-732.
[40]Smith C W and Stulz R.The determinants of firms'hedging policies[J].Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis,1985,20(4):391-405.
[41]Stephen A R.The determination of financial structure:The incentive-signalling approach[J].The Bell Journal of Economics,1977,8(1):23-40.
[42]Zou H and Adams M.Debt capacity,cost of debt,and corporate insurance[J].Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis,2008,43(2):433-466.
[43]Zou H.Hedging affecting firm value via financing and investment:Evidence from property insurance use[J].Financial Management,2010,39(3):965-995.
①保险数据是笔者根据中国资讯行上市公司公告全文数据库相关资料整理而成;上市公司数量是根据上海证券交易所和深圳证券交易所数据整理。
[2]Baker T and Griffith S J.Predicting corporate governance risk:Evidence from the directors’and officers’liability insurance market[J].University of Chicago Law Review,2007,74(2):487-544.
[3]Bessembinder H.Forward contracts and firm value:Investment incentive and contracting effects[J].Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis,1991,26(4):519-532.
[4]Bolton P,et al.Executive compensation and short-termist behavior in speculative markets[J].Review of Economic Studies,2006,73(3):577-610.
[5]Boyer M.Directors’and officers’insurance and shareholder protection[R].Working Paper,HEC Montreal-Department of Finance,2005,Available at SSRN 886504,2005-papers.ssrn.com.
[6]Boyer M and Léa Stern.Is corporate governance risk valued?Evidence from directors’and officers’liability insurance market[J].Journal of Corporate Finance,2012,18(2):349-372.
[7]Chalmers J L,et al.Managerial opportunism?Evidence from directors’and officers’insurance purchases[J].Journal of Finance,2002,57(2):609-636.
[8]Chen J and Li S.Directors’&Officers’insurance and corporate governance[R].Working Paper,National Taiwan University,2008.Available at:http://portal.business.colostate.edu/projects/ARIA/Shared/Documents/1a_Chen_DO/Insurance/Corporate/Governance.pdf.
[9]Chi H,et al.Effects of director and officer equity compensation and liability insurance on corporate diversification and performance[R].AAA 2013Manage-ment Accounting Section(MAS)Meeting Paper,2012.Available at SSRN:http://ssrn.com/abstract=2132610.
[10]Christine K.Directors’and officers’insurance:Ordinary corporate expense or valuable signaling device?[R].Working Paper,Department of Economics Stanford University,2011.Available at:http://dosen.narotama.ac.id/wp-content/uploads/2012/03/Directors-and-Officers-Insurance-Ordinary-Corporate-Expense-or-Valuable-Signaling-Device.pdf.
[11]Core J.On the corporate demand for directors’and officers’insurance[J].Journal of Risk and Insurance,1997,64(1):63-87.
[12]Core J.The directors’and officers’insurance premium:An outside assessment of the quality of corporate Governance[J].Journal of Law,Economics and Organization,2000,16(2):449-477.
[13]DeMarzo P and Duffie D.Corporate financial hedging with proprietary information[J].Journal of Economic Theory,1991,53(2):261-286.
[14]Fama E and Jensen M.Separation of ownership and control[J].Journal of Law and Economics,1983,26(2):301-325.
[15]George D K.The demand for directors’and officers’liability insurance by US public companies[R].Working paper,Southern Methodist University,2004.Available at:SSRN 565183,2004-papers.ssrn.com.
[16]Gillan S and Panasian C.Reassessing what matters in corporate governance:Evidence from the market for directors’and officers’liability insurance[R].Working paper,Texas Tech University,2010a.
[17]Griffith S J.Unleashing agatekeeper:Why the SEC should mandate disclosure of details concerning directors’&officers’liability insurance policies[J].University of Pennsylvania Law Review,2006,154(5):1147-1208.
[18]Grossman S J and Hart O D.One share-one vote and the market for corporate control[J].Journal of Financial Economics January,1988,20(1/2):175-202.
[19]Gupta M and Prakash P.Information embedded in directors and officers insurance purchases[J].The Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance-Issues and Practice,2012,37(3):429-451.
[20]Gutiérrez M.A contractual approach to the regulation of corporate directors’fiduciary duties[R].CEMFI Working Paper,No.0013,2000.Available at:SSRN 257593,2000-papers.ssrn.com.
[21]Gutiérrez M.An economic analysis of corporate directors’fiduciary duties[J].Rand Journal of Economics,2003,34(3):516-535.
[22]Holderness C.Liability insurers as corporate monitors[J].International Review of Law and Economics,1990,10(2):115-129.
[23]Jensen M and William M.Theory of the firm:Managerial behavior agency costs and ownership structure[J].Journal of Financial Economics,1976,3(4):305-360.
[24]Lin C,et al.Directors’and officers’liability insurance and acquisition outcomes[J].Journal of Financial Economics,2011,102(3):507-525.
[25]MacMinn R.Insurance and corporate risk management[J].The Journal of Risk and Insurance,1987,54(4):658-677.
[26]MacMinn R and Garven J.On corporate insurance[M]Handbook of Insurance.Springer Netherlands,2000:541-564.
[27]Main B G.The firm’s insurance decision:Some questions raised by the capital asset pricing model[J].Managerial and Decision Economics,1982,3(1):7-15.
[28]Main B G.Corporate insurance purchase and taxes[J].The Journal of Risk and Insurance,1983,20(2):197-223.
[29]Mayers D and Smith C.On the corporate demand for insurance[J].Journal of Business,1982,55(2):281-296.
[30]Mayers D and Clifford S.Corporate insurance and the underinvestment problem[J].The Journal of Risk and Insurance,1987,24(1):45-54.
[31]Modigliani F and Miller M H.The cost of capital,corporation finance and the theory of investment[J].The American Economic Review,1958,48(3):261-297.
[32]O’Sullivan N.Insuring the agents:The role of directors’and officers’insurance in corporate governance[J].Journal of Risk and Insurance,1997,64(3):545-556.
[33]Rees R,et al.Corporate governance and managerial incentives:Evidence from the market for D&O insurance[R].Working paper,ETH Zurich,2011.
[34]Richard D M,et al.Directors and officers insurance and corporate governance[J].Journal of Insurance Issues,2012,35(2):59-179.
[35]Romano R.Corporate governance in the aftermath of the insurance crisis[A].In Schuck P H(ed.).Tort law and the public interest:Competition,innovation,and consumer welfare[C].New York.1991a.
[36]Romano and Roberta.The shareholder suit:Litigation without foundation?[J].Journal of Law,Economics,&Organization,1991,7(1):55-87.
[37]Rothschild,M.and Stiglitz J.Equilibrium in competitive insurance markets:An essay on the economics of imperfect information[J].Quarterly Journal of Economics,1976,90(4):629-649.
[38]Schleifer A and Vishny R.Large shareholders and corporate control[J].Journal of Political Economy,1986,94(3):461-488.
[39]Skogh G.The transactions cost theory of insurance:Contracting impediments and costs[J].Journal of Risk and Insurance,1989,56(4):726-732.
[40]Smith C W and Stulz R.The determinants of firms'hedging policies[J].Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis,1985,20(4):391-405.
[41]Stephen A R.The determination of financial structure:The incentive-signalling approach[J].The Bell Journal of Economics,1977,8(1):23-40.
[42]Zou H and Adams M.Debt capacity,cost of debt,and corporate insurance[J].Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis,2008,43(2):433-466.
[43]Zou H.Hedging affecting firm value via financing and investment:Evidence from property insurance use[J].Financial Management,2010,39(3):965-995.
①保险数据是笔者根据中国资讯行上市公司公告全文数据库相关资料整理而成;上市公司数量是根据上海证券交易所和深圳证券交易所数据整理。
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胡国柳, 康岚. 董事高管责任保险需求动因及效应研究述评与展望[J]. 外国经济与管理, 2014, 36(3): 10–19.
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