政治关系能实现审计意见购买吗?——基于投资者保护视角的检验
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财经研究 2010 年 第 36 卷第 11 期, 页码：105 - 115
摘要
参考文献
摘要
审计意见购买直接关系到投资者利益保护机制的实现,已经成为当前各国政府关注的重大问题。文章研究发现,整体来看,相对于没有政治关系的公司,有政治关系并不能帮助公司减小获取非标审计意见的概率,但对于前一期被出具非标审计意见的公司来说,政治关系能帮助公司对现任审计师实现审计意见购买;进一步研究发现,有政治关系的公司更倾向于选择大所购买审计意见,并且大所没有收取审计费用溢价。研究结果表明,有政治关系的民营企业不必通过审计师变更,完全可以通过关系向现任(大所)审计师购买审计意见,以减少管制成本。因此独立审计充当法律的替代机制实现对投资者的保护会受到非正式制度(政治关系)的不利影响。
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[13]李爽,吴溪.审计师变更的监管思想、政策效应与学术思想[J].会计研究,2002b,(11):32-36.
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[23]S Titman,B Trueman.Information quality and the valuation of new issues[J].Journalof Accounting and Economics,1986,(8):159-172.
[24]R Bushman,J Piotroski.Financial reporting incentives for conservative accounting:Theinfluence of legal and political institutions[J].Journal of Accounting and Economics,2006,42:107-148.
[25]J Krishman,J Krishnan.Litigation risk and auditor resignations[J].The AccountingReview,1997,72:539-560.
[26]P Chaney,D Jeter,L Shivakumar.Self-selection of auditors and audit pricing in privatefirms[J].The Accounting Review,2004,79:51-72.
引用本文
郑军, 林钟高, 彭琳, 等. 政治关系能实现审计意见购买吗?——基于投资者保护视角的检验[J]. 财经研究, 2010, 36(11): 105–115.
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