政治关系如何影响公司价值:融资约束与行业竞争的证据
财经研究 2010 年 第 36 卷第 10 期, 页码:61 - 70
摘要
参考文献
摘要
政治关系影响了公司价值,但对于如何影响公司价值还知之甚少。文章从资本结构与行业竞争关系的角度检验政治关系如何影响公司价值。基于1998-2007年中国上市公司中制造行业的公司数据,文章发现政治关系提高了行业竞争对资本结构的敏感性。在使用两种不同的融资约束划分标准后,研究发现不同融资约束下公司政治关系的价值不同,对于存在融资约束的公司而言,政治关系更深地影响了行业竞争对资本结构的敏感性,因此具有更高的价值。文章的证据支持了政治关系有助于公司获取融资资源从而提高公司价值的观点。
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[3]余明桂,潘红波.政治关系、制度环境与民营企业银行贷款[J].管理世界,2008,(8):9-21.
[4]Almeida Heitor,Murillo Campello,Michael S Weisbach.The cash flow sensitivity ofcash[J].Journal of Finance,2004,59:1777-1804.
[5]Berkman Henk,Rebel A Cole,Lawrence J Fu.Expropriation through loan guaranteesto related parties:Evidence from China[J].Journal of Banking and Finance,2009,33:141-156.
[6]Bolton Patrick,David S Scharfstein.A theory of predation based on agency problems infinancial contracting[J].American Economic Review,1990,80:93-106.
[7]Brander James,Tracy Lewis.Oligopoly and financial structure:The limited liabilityeffect[J].American Economic Review,1986,76:956-970.
[8]Campello Murillo.Capital structure and product market interactions:Evidence frombusiness cycles[J].Journal of Financial Economics,2003,68:353-378.
[9]Dinc I Serdar.Politicians and banks:Political influences on government-owned banks inemerging countries[J].Journal of Financial Economics,2005,77:453-479.
[10]Faccio M,J McConnell,R Masulis.Political connections and government bailouts[J].Journal of Finance,2006,61:2597-2635.
[11]Fan,Joseph P H,T J Wong,Tianyu Zhang.Politically connected CEOs,corporategovernance,and post-IPO performance of China’s newly partially privatized firms[J].Journal of Financial Economics,2007,84:330-357.
[12]Fazzari Steven,R Glenn Hubbard,Bruce Petersen.Financing constraints and corpo-rate investment[J].Brookings Papers on Economic Activity,1988,1:141-195.
[13]Fisman R.Estimating the value of political connections[J].American Economic Re-view,2001,91:1095-1102.
[14]Kaplan Steven,Luigi Zingales.Do financing constraints explain why investment is correla-ted with cash flow?[J].Quarterly Journal of Economics,1997,112:169-215.
[15]Kaplan Steven,Luigi Zingales.Investment-cash flow sensitivities are not useful measures offinancial constraints[J].Quarterly Journal of Economics,2000,115:707-712.
[16]Khwaja,Asim Ijaz,Atif Mian.Do lenders favor politically connected firms?Rent pro-vision in an emerging financial market[J].Quarterly Journal of Economics,2005,120:1391-1411.
[17]Kroszner R S,T Stratmann.Interest-group competition and the organization of con-gress:Theory and evidence from financial services’political action committees[J].American Economic Review,1998,88:1163-1187.
[18]Lamont Owen,Christopher Polk,Jesus Saa-Requejo.Financial constraints and stockreturns[J].Review of Financial Studies,2001,14:529-554.
[19]Maksimovic Vojislav.Capital structure in repeated oligopolies[J].Rand Journal ofEconomics,1988,19:389-407.
[20]Phillips Gordon M.Increased debt and industry product markets:An empirical analy-sis[J].Journal of Financial Economics,1995,37:189-238.
引用本文
徐龙炳, 李科. 政治关系如何影响公司价值:融资约束与行业竞争的证据[J]. 财经研究, 2010, 36(10): 61–70.
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