正规金融与非正规金融合作会提高农户期望收益吗?——理论分析和实证检验
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财经研究 2011 年 第 37 卷第 04 期, 页码：5 - 15
摘要
参考文献
摘要
文章区分三种不同的市场结构从理论上分析了农户、正规金融机构和非正规金融机构三个主体的决策行为和期望收益,认为只有在正规金融部门与非正规金融部门共存且实现合作的市场中,农户的融资需求才能得到有效满足,农户的期望收益才能最大化。文章还利用遍布我国东、中、西部地区近10 000家农户的实地调研数据进行实证检验,为建立正规金融与非正规金融间的合作机制提供了经验证据。
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[3]李锐,朱喜.农户金融抑制及其福利损失的计量分析[J].经济研究,2007,(2):146-155.
[4]苏群,张爱阳.农村金融体制改革——基于农户借贷行为的分析[J].农村经济,2005,(4):66-69.
[5]谢玉梅.农户借贷约束与供求缺口弥补路径分析[J].中国社会科学院研究生院学报,2006,(4):49-52.
[6]朱守银.中国农村金融市场供给和需求——以传统农区为例[J].管理世界,2003,(3):88-95.
[7]Adel V.Bank-moneylender linkage as an alternative to bank competition in rural creditmarkets[J].Oxford Economic Papers,2005,2:315-335.
[8]Bell C.Interactions betweeninstitutional and informal credit agencies in rural India[J].World Bank Economic Review,1990,4:297-327.
[9]Conning J.Of pirates and moneylenders:Product market competition and the depth oflending relationships in a rural market in Chile[R].mi meo,Depart ment of Economics,Hunter College in New York,2000.
[10]Fuentes G A.The use of village agents in rural credit delivery[J].Journal of Develop-ment Studies,1996,33:188-209.
[11]Hoff K,Stiglitz J.Moneylenders and bankers:Price-increasing subsidiesin a monopolisticallycompetitive market[J].Journal of Development Economics,1998,55:485-518.
[12]Jain S.Symbiosis vs crowding-out:The interaction of formal and informal credit mar-kets in developing countries[J].Journal of Development Economics,1999,59:419-444.
[13]Ray D,Sengupta K.Interlinkages and the pattern of competition[A].P Bardhan.Theeconomic theory of agrarianinstitutions[C].Oxford:Oxford University Press,1989.
引用本文
赵晓菊, 刘莉亚, 柳永明. 正规金融与非正规金融合作会提高农户期望收益吗?——理论分析和实证检验[J]. 财经研究, 2011, 37(4): 5–15.
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