高管薪酬粘性增加了企业投资吗?
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财经研究 2013 年 第 39 卷第 06 期, 页码：64 - 73
摘要
参考文献
摘要
文章利用我国上市公司2006-2010年的高管薪酬和公司业绩数据,考察了高管薪酬粘性对上市公司投资的影响。研究发现,高管薪酬粘性越大,公司重奖轻罚越严重,高管的冒险精神就越强,从而越可能新增投资。同时,这种正向影响在国有企业比在民营企业以及在地方政府控股企业比在中央政府控股企业更加显著,说明2004年以来国资委有关央企负责人薪酬的规定以及有关投资规模的规定起到了一定作用。文章为高管薪酬机制的设计提供了一定的理论依据和经验证据。
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[3]方军雄.我国上市公司高管的薪酬存在粘性吗?[J].经济研究,2009,(3):110-124.
[4]方军雄.高管权力与企业薪酬变动的非对称性[J].经济研究,2011,(4):107-120.
[5]简建辉,余忠福,何平林.经理人激励与公司过度投资——来自中国A股的经验证据[J].经济管理,2011,(4):87-95.
[6]林毅夫,蔡防,李周.充分信息与国有企业改革[M].上海:人民出版社,1997.
[7]罗富碧,冉茂盛,杜家廷.高管人员股权激励与投资决策关系的实证研究[J].会计研究,2008,(8):69-76.
[8]权小锋,吴世农,文芳.管理层权力、私有收益与薪酬操纵[J].经济研究,2010,(11):73-87.
[9]孙铮,刘浩.中国上市公司费用“粘性”行为研究[J].经济研究,2004,(12):26-34.
[10]王艳,孙培源,杨忠直.经理层过度投资与股权激励的契约模型研究[J].中国管理科学,2005,(1):127-131.
[11]辛清泉,林斌,王彦超.政府控制、经理薪酬与资本投资[J].经济研究,2007,(8):110-122.
[12]周中胜.管理层薪酬、现金流与代理成本[J].上海经济研究,2008,(4):73-83.
[13]Aggarwal R K,Samwick A A.Empire-builders and shirkers:Investment,firm performance,and managerial incentives[J].Journal of Corporate Finance,2006,12(3):489-515.
[14]Amihud Y,Lev B.Risk reduction as a managerial motive for conglomerate mergers[J].Bell Journal of Economics,1981,12(2):605-617.
[15]Ang J S,Cole R A,Lin J W.Agency costs and ownership structure[J].Journal of Finance,2000,55(1):81-106.
[16]Bebchuk L A,Fried J.Pay without performance:The unfulfilled promise of executive compensation[M].Harvard University Press,2004.
[17]Bebchuk L,Fried J.Pay without performance:Overview of the issues[J].Journal of Applied Corporate Finance,2005,17(4):8-23.
[18]Bertrand M,Mullainathan S.Enjoying the quiet life?Corporate governance and mana-gerial preferences[J].Journal of Political Economy,2003,111(5):1043-1075.
[19]Coles J L,Daniel N D,Naveen L.Managerial incentives and risk-taking[J].Journal of Financial Economics,2006,79(2):431-468.
[20]Dechow P M,Sloan R G.Executive incentives and the horizon problem:An empirical investigation[J].Journal of Accounting and Economics,1991,14(1):51-89.
[21]Gaver J J,Gaver K M.The relation between nonrecurring accounting transactions and CEO cash compensation[J].Accounting Review,1998,73(2):235-253.
[22]Jensen M C,Meckling W H.Theory of the firm:Managerial behavior,agency costs and ownership structure[J].Journal of Financial Economics,1976,3(4):305-360.
[23]Jensen M C.Agency costs of free cash flow,corporate finance,and takeovers[J].American Economic Review,1986,76(2):323-329.
[24]Jensen M C,Murphy K J.Performance pay and top-management incentives[J].Journal of Political Economy,1990,98(2):225-264.
[25]Kang S H,Kumar P,Lee H.Agency and corporate investment:The role of executive com-pensation and corporate governance[J].Journal of Business,2006,79(3):1127-1147.
[26]Mehran H.Executive compensation structure,ownership,and firm performance[J].Journal of Financial Economics,1995,38(2):163-184.
[27]Richardson S.Over-investment of free cash flow[J].Review of Accounting Studies,2006,11(2):159-190.
[28]Ryan H E,Wiggins R A.The interactions between R&D investment decisions and compensation policy[J].Financial Management,2002,31(1):5-29.
[29]Smith C W,Watts R L.The investment opportunity set and corporate financing,divi-dend,and compensation policies[J].Journal of Financial Economics,1992,32(3):263-292.
引用本文
步丹璐, 文彩虹. 高管薪酬粘性增加了企业投资吗?[J]. 财经研究, 2013, 39(6): 64–73.
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