互联网降低了中小股东获取和使用信息的成本,使其能够更加便利地借助网络进行投票表决(用手投票)或卖出股票(用脚投票)。文章在互联网使用日益普及的背景下,基于双重委托代理关系,将中小股东的两种治理行为(用手投票和用脚投票)置于同一个研究框架下,考察了其对第一类代理成本(经理代理成本)和第二类代理成本(大股东利益侵占)的影响。研究结果表明,中小股东的治理行为对经理代理成本有显著的抑制作用,但对大股东利益侵占的约束作用有限。文章进一步比较了不同的企业环境下中小股东的治理行为对代理成本的影响,以揭示其作用机制。结果表明,用手投票提高经理代理能力存在行政介入机制,用脚投票约束经理在职消费存在市场压力机制。文章的研究为中小股东在公司治理中的角色提供了新的经验证据,为证监会完善网络投票和交易规则提供了政策依据,也为我国新一轮国有企业混合所有制改革的实施提供了理论支持。
网络环境下中小股东的治理效应研究——基于代理成本视角
摘要
参考文献
17 Admati A R, Pfleiderer P. The " Wall Street Walk” and shareholder activism: Exit as a form of voice[J]. The Review of Financial Studies, 2009, 22(7): 2645—2685. DOI:10.1093/rfs/hhp037
18 Ang J S, Cole R A, Lin J W. Agency costs and ownership structure[J]. The Journal of Finance, 2000, 55(1): 81—106. DOI:10.1111/0022-1082.00201
20 Bharath S T, Jayaraman S, Nagar V. Exit as governance: An empirical analysis[J]. The Journal of Finance, 2013, 68(6): 2515—2547. DOI:10.1111/jofi.12073
21 Bogan V. Stock market participation and the internet[J]. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 2008, 43(1): 191—211. DOI:10.1017/S0022109000002799
22 Chen Z, Ke B, Yang Z. Does granting minority shareholders direct control over corporate decisions help reduce value decreasing corporate decisions in firms with concentrated share ownership? A natural experiment from China[J]. The Accounting Review, 2013, 88(4): 1211—1238. DOI:10.2308/accr-50424
23 Grossman S J, Hart O D. Takeover bids, the free-rider problem, and the theory of the corporation[J]. The Bell Journal of Economics, 1980, 11(1): 42—64. DOI:10.2307/3003400
24 Jensen M C, Meckling W H. Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure[J]. Journal of Financial Economics, 1976, 3(4): 305—360. DOI:10.1016/0304-405X(76)90026-X
26 Listokin Y. If you give shareholders power, do they use it? An empirical analysis[J]. Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, 2010, 166(1): 38—53. DOI:10.1628/093245610790711438
27 Luo W, Zhang Y, Zhu N. Bank ownership and executive perquisites: New evidence from an emerging market[J]. Journal of Corporate Finance, 2011, 17(2): 352—370. DOI:10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2010.09.010
28 Maug E. Large shareholders as monitors: Is there a trade-off between liquidity and control?[J]. The Journal of Finance, 1998, 53(1): 65—98. DOI:10.1111/0022-1082.35053
30 Shleifer A, Vishny R W. A survey of corporate governance[J]. The Journal of Finance, 1997, 52(2): 737—783. DOI:10.1111/j.1540-6261.1997.tb04820.x
引用本文
胡茜茜, 朱永祥, 杜勇. 网络环境下中小股东的治理效应研究——基于代理成本视角[J]. 财经研究, 2018, 44(5): 109-120.
导出参考文献,格式为:
上一篇:债权激励降低了银行系统性风险吗?