3247 
3246Taking the rectification policy of the ride-hailing platform as an example, this paper analyzes the effectiveness of two control methods — “driver access threshold” and “platform safety construction”. First, based on the maximization of platform profits and total social welfare, the differences in action incentives under platform autonomy and government regulation are explored. Second, the impact of cost coefficient and driver sensitivity coefficient change on equilibrium is analyzed. Third, the practical effect of three regulatory policies, namely, “government sets the driver access standard” “government sets the platform safety construction standard” and “government and platform jointly set the safety construction standard”, is discussed.
The research results show that in terms of safety construction, the platform’s own efforts are far below the requirements of social optimality. In terms of driver access, incomplete surplus extraction effect, endogenous negative externality effect and internalized driver cost effect comprehensively determine the gap of choice between platform and government. Under the joint supervision, when the driver access threshold has a certain negative impact on “good drivers”, the government should take the advantage of relatively strict driver access screening set by the platform itself and strive to make up for the platform’s lack of incentives for safety construction. At this time, “government and platform jointly set the safety construction standard” and “government sets the platform safety construction standard” are the optimal regulatory choice. When the driver’s access threshold does not have a negative impact on “good drivers” and access screening has a certain cost efficiency, the government should take the advantage of the platform’s relatively strong incentives for self-safety construction and make up for the insufficient platform screening. At this time, “government sets the driver access standard” is the best choice. When access screening is no longer cost-effective, “government and platform jointly set the safety construction standard” and “government sets the platform safety construction standard” remain the optimal regulatory choice.
This paper tries to make contributions in the following aspects: First, the existing literature mostly considers that the control of merchant product quality is mostly based on the product evaluation system. This paper further introduces the regulatory method of access screening, and the research results have stronger practical significance. Second, from the perspectives of platform and social optimality, this paper discusses the similarities and differences of using the two governance methods and explores the differences between platforms and government supervision. Third, from the perspective of joint supervision, this paper considers the differences in the effect of the three regulatory policies in different scenarios, and the research conclusions have strong practical significance.
