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1510针对近年来公司违规行为的组织化和团体化趋势，文章以2013—2021年A股上市公司为研究对象，运用部分可观测的Bivariate Probit模型，从违规行为的倾向和被发现的概率两个角度，研究高管团队断裂带对公司违规行为的影响，以及企业内部条件和外部所处环境对上述关系的调节作用。研究发现：高管团队断裂带显著增加了公司违规行为的倾向，降低了公司违规行为被发现的概率；具有企业家精神以及注重数字化转型的公司能够很好地抑制高管团队断裂带对公司违规行为的显著影响；高管团队断裂带对公司违规行为的影响，只在市场化程度和收入不平等程度较低的地区显著。进一步研究发现，高管团队断裂带的消极作用在信息披露违规、股票交易违规的倾向及证券交易所负责稽查的违规中更显著；区分断裂带类型后，表层断裂带对公司违规行为的影响更显著。文章丰富了高管团队断裂带与公司违规的研究，为我国上市公司构建高管团队提供参考依据。
分裂的高管团队会增加公司的违规行为吗?
摘要
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引用本文
陈华, 王壮. 分裂的高管团队会增加公司的违规行为吗?[J]. 上海财经大学学报, 2024, 26(3): 108-122.
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