6121 
5647对于管理层激励与企业研发之间的关系，截至目前一直未能获得一致的研究结论。随着研究的不断深入，融资约束在管理层激励与企业研发关系中的重要性也渐渐得到学术界的认可。为明确融资约束对管理层激励与企业研发效率关系的影响，本文基于2009-2013年中国工业上市公司样本数据，运用随机前沿模型考察了管理层激励对企业研发效率的影响，研究表明：对管理层实行货币薪酬激励有利于提高企业研发效率水平，而在对管理层实行股权激励时，应根据企业自身的实际情况给予最佳的持股比例，以避免因股权激励不足或股权激励过大导致企业研发效率低下。同时，考虑到企业所面临的融资约束的现实情况，我们发现，融资约束的存在在一定程度上抑制了货币薪酬激励对企业研发效率的积极作用；相反，却能提高股权激励在企业研发创新方面的治理效应。本文不仅丰富了公司治理与创新管理的相关研究成果，也为企业合理配置管理层薪酬契约以提高企业研发效率的决策提供了经验证据。
融资约束视角下管理层激励对企业研发效率的影响研究
摘要
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引用本文
雷鹏, 梁彤缨, 陈修德. 融资约束视角下管理层激励对企业研发效率的影响研究[J]. 外国经济与管理, 2016, 38(10): 60–75.
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