西方家族企业代理问题研究现状
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外国经济与管理 2005 年 第 27 卷第 06 期, 页码：36 - 43
摘要
参考文献
摘要
本文根据国外有关家族企业的文献,对家族企业代理问题进行了梳理和总结。这一领域存在颇多争议,主流代理理论认为家族企业能有效降低代理成本;有些学者研究了中小型非上市家族企业,认为这类企业不仅不能降低代理成本,反而还会产生一系列新的代理问题。有关大型上市家族企业代理问题的观点分歧更为严重,有的学者认为家族所有和控制能带来诸多优势,有的学者认为大型家族企业的代理问题比公众公司更加严重,还有的学者认为缺乏足够的证据表明家族企业和代理成本之间存在必然的联系。
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[2]Berglf,E&vonThadden,EL.Thechangingcorporategovernanceparadigm:implicationsfordevelopingandtransition economies[A].InCohen,SS,Boyd,G(eds.),2000.
[3]Buchanan,JM.Thesamaritan’sdilemma[A].In:Phelps,ES(Ed.).Altruism,moralityandeconomictheory[C].RussellSageFoundation,NewYork,1975.
[4]Jensen,MC.Foundationsoforganizationalstrategy[M].Cambridge,MA:HarvardUniversityPress,1998.
[5]Jensen,MC.&Meckling,WH.Theoryofthefirm:managerialbehavior,agencycostsandownershipstructure[J].JournalofFinancialEconomics,1976,3(4):305-360.
[6]Peng,MW&Jiang,Yi.Familyownershipandcontrolinlargecorporations:thegood,thebad,theirrelevant[J/OL].www.ilir.uiuc.edu/lubotsky/PengJiang0411.pdf,2004.
[7]Schulze,WS,MHLubatkin,&RNDino.Towardatheoryofagencyandaltruisminfamilyfirms[J].JournalofBus inessVenturing,2003a,18(4):473-490.
[8]Schulze,WS,MHLubatkin&RNDino.Exploringtheagencyconsequenceofownershipdispersionamongthedirec torsofprivatefamilyfirms[J].AcademyofManagementProceedings,2003b,46(2):179-194.
[9]Schulze,WS,MHLubatkin,YLing.&RNDino.Altruismandagencyinfamilyfirms[J].AcademyofManagement Proceedings,2000,1:11-15.
[10]Schulze,WS,MHLubatkin,YLing,RNDino&Buchholtz,AK.Agencyrelationshipsinfamilyfirms:theoryand evidence[J].OrganizationScience,2001,12:99-116.
[11]Schulze,WS,MHLubatkin,YLing,&RNDino.Altruism,agencyandthecompetitivenessoffamilybusiness[J].ManagerialandDecisionEconomics,2002,4:257-259.
[12]Thaler,RH&Shefrin,HM.Aneconomictheoryofself control[J].JournalofPoliticalEconomy,1981,89:392-406.
引用本文
王明琳, 周生春. 西方家族企业代理问题研究现状[J]. 外国经济与管理, 2005, 27(6): 36–43.
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