The Central Environmental Inspection System, a major innovation in environmental governance, has become a pivotal mechanism driving China’s green economic development. While existing research largely examines the indirect transmission of inspection pressure (i.e., from inspection teams to local governments and then to enterprises), there is limited discussion on the direct impact of inspection teams on individual enterprises. This paper focuses on the governance effect of Central Environmental Inspections on A-share listed central state-owned enterprises from 2018 to 2022. The findings reveal a significant negative market reaction around the inspection announcement dates, particularly in high-pollution and high-energy-consuming enterprises, and those without environmental certification. The inspections help improve environmental performance by encouraging greater investment in environmental protection and enhance economic performance by increasing resource efficiency. The effect is especially pronounced in enterprises with strong control by the parent group, those with executives holding multiple positions within the group, or those included in the “Double Hundred Enterprises” initiative. This paper provides valuable insights for advancing China’s environmental governance system and offers theoretical support for balancing high-quality economic development with ecological protection.